The International Criminal Court And The Concept Of Mens Rea In International Criminal Law by Van der Vyver, Johan D.
University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review 
Volume 12 
Issue 1 Volume 12 (2004): The Prosecution of 
War Crimes and the International Criminal Court 
Article 3 
7-1-2004 
The International Criminal Court And The Concept Of Mens Rea In 
International Criminal Law 
Johan D. Van der Vyver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Johan D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court And The Concept Of Mens Rea In International 
Criminal Law, 12 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 57 (2004) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol12/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami International and Comparative 
Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more 
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu. 
The International Criminal Court and the
Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law
Johan D. Van der Vyver*
I. Introduction
Legal historians have established that ancient or
developing legal systems by and large have certain charac-
teristics in common, for example great emphasis on common
group interests rather than on individual rights, a strong
paternalistic strain with little regard for the rights and interests of
women, and inflicting punishment for wrongful acts irrespective
of the subjective accountability of the perpetrator.1
The criminal-law system in underdeveloped communi-
ties is specially noted for laying stress on the external act that
constitutes the actus reus of a crime while almost entirely
disregarding the subjective element of fault as a condition of
criminal liability. Punishment is founded on the talio principle
(an eye for an eye) and is based on vengeance for the damages or
harm suffered by the victim of a wrongful act.
It is a salient principle of legal ethics that a person ought
not to be punished for wrongful acts unless the perpetrator's
conduct was attended by a blameworthy state of mind (fault).
The principle encapsulated in the maxim actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea (an act does not render the perpetrator culpable
unless there is a criminal intention) thus represents a moral
directive of the legal idea. Although almost all the developed
legal systems of the world recognize instances of absolute or
strict liability, those instances would, in ethically-based criminal
justice systems, remain restricted to highly exceptional instances
of technical misdemeanors or where possession of or control
over objects that are inherently dangerous or likely to be used for
criminal purposes would merit invoking the notion of risk
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liability.
The degree of emphasis on culpability as an essential
element of criminal liability and as a decisive consideration for
establishing the nature and severity of punishment has also
become a dividing factor between the (Anglo-American)
common-law criminal justice systems and those based on the
(Romanistic) civil-law tradition. The latter systems tend to be
quite dogmatic, identifying and meticulously defining all the
elements that constitute a crime in general and (neatly classified)
specific crimes in particular. There is a strong tendency toward
logical consistency in holding everyone criminally answerable
for conduct that fits the textbook designation of a wrongful act
and the fixed criteria of culpability. The Anglo-American
approach, on the other hand, seems more casuistic, seeking to
uphold a just outcome in the individual case rather than striving
toward scholarly uniformity. It seeks to uphold equity in the
Aristotelian sense in the isolated cases where application of a
general rule would cause an injustice. 2 As far as the concept of
fault is concerned, Anglo-American jurisprudence has no
problem with applying logical inconsistencies such as entering a
verdict of "guilty but insane" or proclaiming that ignorance of
the law is no excuse. The Anglo-American criminal justice
systems are also less committed to the general adage of "no
liability without fault" than their civil-law counterparts.
The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC
Statute) upholds the principle of no liability without fault and
2 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle defined equity as a form of justice that goes
beyond the written law and applies (a) in cases not foreseen by the
legislator (casus omissus), and (b) in instances where the legislator was
unable to formulate a general rule that would fit all cases. In the latter
context, Aristotle explained that even though the general rule will serve
justice in most of the cases, there will almost invariably be isolated
instances where application of the general rule would not serve justice,
for-in the words of Aristotle himself-"a lifetime would be too short
to enumerate all the possible cases." Here, equity is applied as a
corrective of general justice in order to restore justice in the individual
(hard-luck) case. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC Bk. 1, 13, at ch. X 11.
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furthermore includes in its circumscription of mens rea, a
restricted manifestation of intent that has to be applied as a
general rule. The concept of fault to be applied by the ICC has
almost exclusively been adopted from the civil-law criminal
justice systems. Accordingly, the ICC regime is founded on
notions and principles that are not familiar to common-law
countries and is based on a vocabulary that many lawyers
schooled in the common-law might find foreign to their own
legal usage. While the influence of Anglo-American perceptions
of the subjective element of criminal liability has filtered through
in some judgments of the International Criminal Court for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), those precedents cannot be followed
in the International Criminal Court (ICC). Also worth noting is
the fact that the Anglo-American perceptions of the subjective
element of criminal liability did not to the same degree influence
the judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR).
This article introduces the reader to the language and
reasoning pertinent to the concept of mens rea designed for ICC
purposes. This also happens to be the language and reasoning
which one might expect will, under influence of the ICC,
become the norm of international criminal law. The article
furthermore addresses some of the difficulties that inevitably
emerged from the general imperfections of language as a means
of encapsulating the exact meaning of legalistic concepts as well
as those to be expected from a document that had to be
negotiated between delegations representing extremely diverse
criminal justice systems and within considerable time
constraints.
Section A of the article defines concepts denoting the
different manifestations of fault. Section B gives an overview of
the general requirement of mens rea for ICC jurisdictional
purposes. Implementation of mens rea as an element of the
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes is
dealt with separately and respectively in Sections C, D and E.
The article finally, in Section F, analyses subjective attributes of
the perpetrator (mental disorder, intoxication, and juvenile
status) and a mental disposition (mistake) that exclude intent
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and/or knowledge, and as such serve as grounds for exculpation.
The article seeks, within the general confines
aforementioned, to find an answer to several problems that are
not expressly addressed in the ICC-problems that therefore
must be resolved on basis of the general principles of criminal
justice that are basic to the ICC regime. The constitutive
elements of fault (intent and knowledge) only apply unless
otherwise provided by the ICC Statute. Therefore, it becomes
important to identify the specific crimes within the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the ICC where a conviction will be
dependent on a more stringent, or may be based on a lesser, form
of fault. It is also important to distinguish between crimes where
intent to engage in the criminal conduct is all that has to be
proved as far as mens rea is concerned (conduct oriented or
general intent crimes) and those crimes where accountability is
also dependent on an intent to bring about a certain consequence
of the criminal conduct (consequence oriented or special intent
crimes). The ICC Statute gives no clear answer to the question
of whether or not a military commander can be convicted of
genocide in cases where the element of fault on his or her part is
confined to a negligent neglect to control the conduct of the
troops under his or her command. It is also important to be
reminded of judgments of the Nuremberg Tribunal instructing
those engaged in the administration of justice not to second
guess value judgments made by a commanding officer in a
combat situation but to be sensitive to the special conditions and
often split-second pressures under which those judgments have
to be made and acted upon.
Jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR provide useful
guidance, for example, in identifying rape as a very special
manifestation of genocide. When dealing with murder as a
crime against humanity or a war crime, the ICC is precluded by
the mens rea doctrine preferred by drafters of the ICC Statute
from following Anglo-American precedents that afford sanction
to a conviction for murder in cases where the perpetrator
intended to cause grievous bodily harm while knowing that death
might ensue in the ordinary course of events, or in reckless
disregard of the possible fatal consequences of the assault (and
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death of the victim did set in). The implications of including
words denoting intent in the definitions of some of the crimes
against humanity and war crimes, while not in others, alongside
a general requirement of "intent and knowledge" applying to all
crimes "unless otherwise provided" require careful scrutiny.
Including in the chapeau of the crimes-against-humanity
definitions a reference to "knowledge of the attack" constituting
the crime against humanity, while only referring to "knowledge"
and not to "intent", is particularly problematic, since it may be
taken to exclude the element of intent that would otherwise
constitute a vital component of mens rea, and this in turn could
apply to crimes against humanity in general or only to the attack
constituting the crime against humanity.
A. The Conceptual Framework
The notion of fault is comprised of either intent (dolus)
or negligence (culpa). A wrongful act is committed
intentionally if the perpetrator contemplated the illegality and/or
harmful consequences of the act. Negligence denotes the mental
disposition of a person who commits a wrongful act, and
although the person who committed the act did not intend to act
illegally or to cause the harmful consequences of the act, in
doing so he or she deviated from conduct expected of a
reasonable person within the same circumstances. While the
person who acts intentionally foresees the illegality and harmful
consequences of his or her act, the person who acts negligently
does not appreciate the illegality or the harmful consequences of
his or her action, while a reasonable person would in the
prevailing circumstances have foreseen and avoided acting
illegally or bringing about the harmful consequences of the act.
Donald Piragoff was quite right in asserting that
3 The American legal system deals with the element of fault with a
different arsenal of concepts, focused upon acting purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently. See MODEL PENAL CODE
(American Legal Institute), § 2.02(2) (1962); see also Margaret
McAuliffe deGuzman, The Road to Rome: The Developing Law of
Crimes Against Humanity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 335, 394-98 (2000).
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"'intent' . . . connotes some element, although only minimal, of
desire or willingness to do the action, in light of an awareness of
the relevant circumstances." ' However, intent does not
necessarily include a desire to bring about the consequences of
the act. The mental component attending human conduct (i.e.,
the what and the why of conscious acts and omissions) involves
several distinct modalities of reason, two of which qualify and
distinguish various manifestations of intent. Both entertain the
what question of human conduct, not the why:
" Deliberately contemplating the act or omission and its
consequences in the sense of acting or omitting to act
knowingly, and foreseeing the consequences of the act
or omission; and
* Desiring or setting out to accomplish the consequences
of the act or omission, or wanting those consequences to
occur.
Whereas the first is an essential element of intent, the second is
not but serves to distinguish the first and the second degree of
intent.
Intent can take on one of three forms, to be distinguished
in view of the presence or absence of a desire to bring about the
harmful consequences that emanated from the act or omission:
* Dolus directus, in which event the illegality and/or
harmful consequence of the act was foreseen and desired
by the perpetrator (A desires the death of B and foresees
4 Donald K. Piragoff, Mental Element, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 527, 533 (Otto
Triffierer ed., 1999) [hereinafter Commentary on the Rome Statute].
5 See Steffen Wirth, Gegen Volkermord und Vertreibung: Die
Uberwindung des zwanstigsten Jahrhunderts, in 28 ARGUMENTE UND




that his act will bring about B's death: if A in these
circumstances commits the act and B dies in
consequence of that act, then A will be judged to have
acted with direct intent to kill B);
" Dolus indirectus, in which event certain (secondary)
consequences in addition to those desired by the
perpetrator of the act were foreseen by the perpetrator as
a certainty, and although the perpetrator did not desire
those secondary consequences he or she nevertheless
committed the act and those consequences did set in (A
desires the death of B and foresees that if he were to put
poison in B's food, other guests at B's table will most
certainly also die; knowing that C will be joining B for
dinner, A nevertheless poisons the food and in so doing
causes the death of both B and C; in regard to the death
of C, A acted with indirect intent); and
" Dolus eventualis, in which event the perpetrator foresees
consequences other than those desired as a possibility
(including a likelihood of the consequences setting in)
and nevertheless went ahead with the act (A desires the
death of B and foresees that if he were to shoot B while
B is driving his car, other passengers in the car may
possibly also be injured or even killed; if B nevertheless
goes ahead and shoots B while B is driving the car with
C as his passenger, A will be held liable for the injuries,
or the death, of C under the rubric of dolus eventualis
even though he might not have wished C any harm).
Dolus eventualis differs from negligence. In the case of dolus
eventualis, the perpetrator foresees that (secondary)
consequences might result from the wrongful act; in the case of
negligence, the person does not foresee those consequences
while a reasonable person situated in the same circumstances
would have been expected to foresee the possibility of those
consequences resulting from the wrongful act.
In Anglo/American legal systems, dolus eventualis is
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usually defined as a manifestation of fault in cases where the
perpetrator acted "recklessly" in regard to the (undesired)
consequences of the act.6 In legal systems where "recklessness"
features prominently in the circumscription of fault, the
distinction between dolus eventualis and negligence becomes
blurred. 7 Antonio Cassese, for example, uses language
indicating that recklessness is something other than intent
(referring to recklessness and negligence as forms of mens rea
"other than intent") but in the very same paragraph
circumscribes dolus eventualis (a certain manifestation of intent)
as "advertent recklessness",
s
Antonio Cassese has criticized the ICC Statute for not
recognizing "recklessness" as the basis of liability for war
crimes. 9 However, if one takes into account the resolve to
6 In Prosecutor v. BlaWki6, the ICTY defined "recklessness," citing
Belgian authors CHRISTINE HENNAU & JACQUES VERHAGEN, DRIOT
PENAL GtNRAL (2d ed., 1995) (1991) in much the same terms as those
applying to dolus eventualis: "the action is foreseen by the perpetrator
as only a probable or possible consequence," or "taking a deliberate
risk in the hope that the risk does not cause injury." Prosecutor v.
Tihomir Blagki, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 249 (3 March 2000).
7 The American Model Penal Code distinguishes between recklessness
and negligence along the following lines: the person acting recklessly,
"consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element [of an offense] exists or will result from his conduct"
and disregarding the risk "involves a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation"; the person acting negligently, "should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element [of an
offense] exists or will result from his conduct" and taking the risk
"involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor's situation." MODEL PENAL CODE,
supra note 3, § 2.02(2)(c) and (d).
8 Antonio Cassese, Crimes against Humanity, in THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 353, 364
(Antonio Cassese, et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter the Commentary on the
ICC].
9 Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court:
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confine the jurisdiction of the ICC to "the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole," '0 it is
reasonable to accept that crimes committed without the highest
degree of dolus ought as a general rule not to be prosecuted in
the ICC.
B. Mens Rea as Defined in the ICC Statute
The ICC Statute upholds the principle of no liability
without fault to the letter:
Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court
only if the material elements are committed with
intent and knowledge.
The conjunctive requirement of intent and knowledge 12 is further
defined in the ICC Statute. Article 30(2) defines intent as
follows:
For the purposes of this article, a person has
intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to
engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person
means to cause that consequence or is aware that
it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 144, 153-54 (1999).
10 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, art. 1, opened for signature July 17, 1998 (entered into
force July 1, 2002), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998) [hereinafter
ICC Statute].
"'Id. art. 30(1).
12 LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW
MILLENNIUM, 210 (Transnat'l Publ. ed., 2002).
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"Knowledge" is defined in the ICC Statute as "awareness that a
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary
course of events."' 13 This definition covers dolus directus and
dolus indirectus only. 4 Therefore, even if one were to hold that
"intent" in relation to conduct, as defined in the ICC Statute,
includes dolus eventualis, this form of intentional conduct will
be excluded by the provision requiring intent and knowledge,
read with the above definition of "knowledge".
In terms of Article 30(1) of the ICC Statute, the
requirement of "intent and knowledge" applies "[u]nless
otherwise provided." This introductory phrase makes allowance
for deviations from the general requirement of intent and
knowledge (dolus directus or dolus indirectus) in particular
instances expressly provided for in the ICC Statute.
At the one end of the spectrum, the ICC Statute in some
cases makes allowance for liability based on a lesser form of
fault. For example, command responsibility in a military setting
can be based on negligence, namely if forces under the effective
command, authority or control of the accused have committed a
crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC as a result of the
commander's failure to exercise proper control over such forces
and he or she, "owing to the circumstances at the time," did not
actually know but "should have known" that the forces were
committing or were about to commit the crime. 15 A superior
other than a military commander can likewise be held
responsible for crimes committed by his or her subordinates if,
inter alia, he or she did not actually know but "consciously
disregarded" information indicating that the subordinate was
committing or was about to commit the crime. 16 Here,
13 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 30(3).
14 Piragoff, supra note 4, at 534. According to Piragoff, this phrase
denotes dolus eventualis. That, in this writer's respectful opinion, is
not correct. "Awareness that ... a consequence will occur" denotes
dolus indirectus. Emphasis added.
15 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 28(1)(a).
16 See id. art. 28(2)(a). According to Donald Piragoff, this is an
instance of liability based on "recklessness." Piragoff, supra note 4, at
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negligence will not suffice. Liability can, on the other hand, be
based on intent in the form of dolus directus, dolus indirectus or
dolus eventualis. The superior who consciously disregarded
information (willful blindness) will be liable if the information
he disregarded indicated as a certainty or as a possibility that his
or her subordinates were up to no good.
At the other end of the spectrum, a special form of intent
might be required. For example, whereas liability under the ICC
Statute can in general be based on dolus directus as well as dolus
indirectus, the war crime constituted by extensive destruction and
appropriation of property not justified by military necessity, having to
be carried out "wantonly", will require dolus directus.1 7
1. Constructive Knowledge
The question whether or not "constructive knowledge"
would render a person liable for any of the crimes within the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC will depend on the exact
meaning given to the concept of constructive knowledge.
In Prosecutor v. Tadi6 (Judgment), the Trial Chamber
held "if the perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or
constructive . .. that is sufficient to hold him liable for crimes
against humanity." 18 Similar statements of the law were
subsequently repeated in almost all the cases dealing with crimes
the text accompanying note 20. See also Per Saland, International
Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS
189, 206 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). In civil law systems, this would be
construed as an instance of liability based on dolus eventualis or
perhaps even dolus indirectus. Although dolus indirectus as well as
dolus eventualis require actual knowledge (either as a certainty or as a
possibility or likelihood that the harmful consequences will/may ensue,
respectively), deliberately not wanting to know will be construed as
knowledge of at least the possibility that the crime will be committed.
ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(2)(a)(iv).
'8 Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadi6 (Judgment), Case No. IT-94-1-T, 657 (7
May 1997), reprinted in 112 I.L.R. 2
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against humanity, 19 without any effort ever having been made to
define the exact meaning of "constructive knowledge." If
"constructive knowledge" means attributing to the perpetrator
knowledge which he or she did not in fact possess, such
"knowledge" cannot be equated to "awareness" as contemplated
in the general definition of "intent and knowledge" of the ICC
Statute. It should be borne in mind, however, that "intent and
knowledge" in that special sense is not required when "otherwise
provided" in the ICC Statute, and in cases where a lesser form of
intent (dolus eventualis or negligence) would suffice to render a
perpetrator liable-which do not include any of the crimes
against humanity-instances of "constructive knowledge" in that
sense might well become relevant. But then, again, actual
knowledge is also part and parcel of dolus eventualis, albeit only
in the form of foreseeing the consequences as a possibility or
likelihood. Moreover, since actual knowledge is not an element
of negligence at all, constructing knowledge on the part of the
perpetrator would in any event be superfluous for purposes of
establishing accountability for the crime constituted by negligent
conduct.
If, on the other hand, "constructive knowledge" was
intended to denote cases where knowledge cannot be proved by
direct evidence but may be construed on basis of the surrounding
facts and circumstances-where, therefore, "constructive
knowledge" is a matter of evidence and not of substantive law-
reliance on such knowledge to substantiate a conviction for a
crime against humanity cannot be faulted. In Tadi, the ICTY in
that sense confirmed that knowledge can be "implied from the
19 In the ICTR, see Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-
13-T, 206 (27 Jan. 1999); Prosecutor v. Cldment Kayishema, Case No.
ICTR-95-1-T, 134 (21 May 1999); Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda,
Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, 71 (6 Dec. 1999); Prosecutor v. Georges
Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-93-32-T, 20 (1 June 2001). In the ICTY, see
Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupre~kic & Others, Case No. IT-95-16-T, 557
(14 Jan. 2000); Prosecutor v. Blagkid, supra note 6, 249; Prosecutor




circumstances., 20 Not every perpetrator of genocide, crimes
against humanity or war crimes boast about their evil deeds,
though many do. Courts are often obligated to construe a certain
mental disposition based on secondary evidence. Provided the
possession of guilty knowledge is a sine qua non (beyond
reasonable doubt) of the surrounding facts and circumstances, a
conviction for the crime based on intent and knowledge would
be fully justified.
2. General Intent and Specific Intent
By distinguishing between intent in relation to conduct
and intent in relation to a consequence, the ICC Statute addresses
a question that is puzzling in some criminal justice systems: Can
a person be held criminally liable for a crime requiring intent if
he or she deliberately committed the act with which he or she is
being charged, or must the intent of the accused in addition be
aimed at the harmful consequences which emanated from the
wrongful act? In some legal systems, once it has been proven
that the accused intended to do, or to refrain from doing, that
which constitutes the actus reus, he or she will be held
criminally liable for all the reasonable consequences of the act
notwithstanding the fact that he or she may not have intended to
bring about (some of) those consequences. For example, A
plants a bomb in the parking lot of an abortion clinic. B, a
cardiac, is walking down the street when the bomb explodes and,
being startled by the explosion, suffers a heart attack and dies.
Can A be held criminally liable for the death of B?
In the Nuremberg Trials, the distinction between conduct
crimes (general intent) and crimes where criminal liability is
dependent upon the act serving as a means of bringing about
certain specified consequences (special intent) was upheld, and it
was there noted that the special intent required for the latter
category of crimes may not be presumed as a consequence of the
20 Prosecutor v. Tadid, supra note 18, 657; see also Rodney Dixon,
Crimes Against Humanity, Introduction/General Remarks, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ICC, supra note 8, 121, at 128 n.49.
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act but must be proved.2'
The ICC Statute likewise makes allowance for both
categories of crimes. Intentionally directing attacks against the
civilian population or against individual civilians not taking
direct part in hostilities 22 thus renders the act punishable
irrespective of the consequences, whereas certain inhumane acts
will only constitute a crime against humanity if it causes great
suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health. In the former instance, intent and knowledge pertain to
the act as such, in the latter the consequence of causing great
suffering or serious injury must also be within the contemplation
of the perpetrator. There are certain crimes where the actus reus
and mens rea interact, for example in the case of willful
killings. 24 Here intent and knowledge are geared toward the act
that causes death and which is essentially tied up in its fatal
25consequence.
The distinction made in the ICC Statute in regard to the
mental element pertaining to conduct and the mental element
pertaining to a consequence of the conduct, respectively, is
significant. Taken separately, these two components of intent
signify different manifestations of intent. The phrase
designating the mental element in the former context (the
accused "means to engage in the conduct") would, according to
general principles of criminal law, include dolus directus, dolus
indirectus, and dolus eventualis. The phrase designating the
mental element that must exist in relation to the consequences of
the act (the accused "means to cause the consequence or is aware
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events") covers dolus
21 See, e.g., The United States of America v. Alfried Felix Alwyn
Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach & Others, in 9 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAw NO. 10, 1378 (U.S. Gov. Printers) (1950).
22 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(2)(b)(i).
23 Id. art. 7(1)(k).
24 Id art. 8(2)(a)(i).
25 See Piragoff, supra note 4, at 533.
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directus and dolus indirectus only. 26 Taken together, they
therefore exclude dolus eventualis.
The crime of genocide requires a distinct manifestation
of dolus specialis: the acts constituting genocide must be
committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group."' 27 The "intent to destroy"
leaves scope for dolus directus only. However, a conviction for
complicity in genocide, according to the judgment of the ICTR
in Akayesu, can be based on either dolus directus or dolus
indirectus.28 Since in terms of the ICC Statute the element of
mens rea can in general include both of these forms of intent for
any of the modes of participation in a crime stipulated in Article
25(3),29 the ICC could, and should, uphold this jurisprudentially
sound position.
Special intent also qualifies certain crimes against
humanity. The crime of apartheid, for example, must be
30committed "with the intention of maintaining" a racist regime,
and the crime of enforced disappearance of persons requires that
the arrest, detention or abduction of the victims must have been
executed "with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.' A
special mental disposition is added to the requirement of intent
and knowledge in the case of the war crime of "treacherously"
killing or wounding persons belonging to a hostile nation or
26 Id. According to Piragoff, the combination of "intent" and
"knowledge" as contemplated in the ICC Statute denotes dolus
directus. This writer respectfully disagrees. It is not the knowledge of,
but the desire to bring about, the harmful consequences of one's act that
qualifies intent to become dolus directus.
ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 6.
28 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 538-40,
543-44, 724 (2 Sept. 1998), Prosecutor v. Ignace Baglishema, Case No.
ICTR-95-1A-T, 60 (7 June 2001).
29 See Piragoff, supra note 4, at 529-31.
30 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(h).
" Id. art. 7(2)(i).
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32
army.
There is yet another instance of special intent regulated
by the ICC Statute that requires emphasis. In terms of the
principle of complementarity that is fundamental to the exercise
of jurisdiction by the ICC, the first right and duty to bring
perpetrators of crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the ICC to justice vest in the national courts of states with a
special interest in the matter. The ICC jurisdiction can only be
invoked if the national state is either unwilling or unable to
conduct an investigation into, and if needs be to prosecute, the
crime.33 Inability is defined in terms of the total or substantial
collapse or unavailability of the national judicial system. 34
"Unwillingness" within the meaning of the ICC Statute is
founded on the special intent of national authorities to conduct
sham proceedings, to take faked decisions, or to cause
unjustified delays in their investigation or prosecution of the
crime. The ICC Statute encapsulates the special intent that
applies in this regard as one aimed at "shielding the person
concerned from criminal responsibility," or one that is
"inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice." 3  It is not only a matter of conducting questionable
proceedings, taking suspect decisions, or causing inexplicable
delays. There must be the added purpose of shielding the suspect
from prosecution in the ICC or a decided resolve not to bring
him or her to justice.
3. Versari in re Iicita
In terms of the versari doctrine, a person committing a
wrongful act is held responsible for all the harmful consequences
of the act, irrespective of his or her participation in the act as
such or fault on his or her part with regard to those other
consequences. For example, A robs a groceries store, and B, the
32 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xi), read with art. 8(2)(e)(ix).
33 Id. Fourth and Tenth Preambular Principles and art. 17(1).
141d. art. 17(3).
31 d art. 17(2).
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shop owner, fires a shot at the robber in defense of his property.
However, B misses the robber and accidentally shoots and kills
his own wife. In terms of the versari rule, the robber can be held
criminally liable for the death of B's wife.36
The versari rule is frowned upon in legal systems where
criminal liability is strictly based on fault in respect of the
harmful consequences of the criminal act. 37 The circumscription
in the ICC Statute of the "mental element" as a precondition for
criminal liability, clearly excludes versari in re illicita.
Versari in re illicita must not be confused with aberratio
ictus (deflection of the blow). If A fires a shot with intent to kill
B, misses and kills C in the process, A will be criminally liable
for the death of C in virtue of his or her intent to take a human
life.
4. Malice Aforethought
The requirement in some criminal justice systems of
malice as, supposedly, a constituent element of intent for
purposes of criminal liability for certain offences is also not part
of the ICC's theoretical make-up. Malice is a component of the
motive that prompts certain conduct and is not an ingredient of
fault. Intent, a certain manifestation of fault, has to do with the
guilty knowledge of the perpetrator (i.e., what did the perpetrator
contemplate with his or her act; did he or she foresee the
consequences of his or her act, either as a certainty or as a
possibility?). Malice, on the other hand, addresses the question
as to why the perpetrator acted wrongfully. In Prosecutor v.
Jelesi6, the ICTY correctly emphasized the need to distinguish
between intent and motive, but overstated the matter when it
went on to proclaim the irrelevance of motive in criminal law.38
Malice can, on the contrary, serve as proof of intent, and it can
36 For a discussion and application of the versari-rule in the United
States, see Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979).
17 See, e.g., the Canadian case of R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633
(striking down sec. 213(a) of the Criminal Code (R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34),
which had sanctioned the versari rule).
38 Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisid, Case No. IT-95-I0-A, 49 (5 July 2001).
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be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance that would
influence the sentence imposed by a criminal court. Malice is
not, however, a component of intent as such. 39  Intentional
homicide is not necessarily motivated by malice, ill-will or spite,
it may be prompted by compassionate, and some might even
profess noble, considerations, for example in the case of
euthanasia.
There are an isolated number of offences of which
malice is essentially a requirement-not as a manifestation of
intent but as a distinct element in its own right of the offence.
Cases of malicious prosecution or cases of murder with malice
aforethought as a special category of criminal homicide may
serve as examples in this regard.4°
39 Wirth, supra note 5, refers to the element that distinguishes dolus
directus (first degree dolus directus) from dolus indirectus (second
degree dolus directus), namely the desire to bring about the
consequences, as the "motive" of the perpetrator: "Die Zerstorung der
Gruppe muss dem Motiv des Thters dienen. Nichts anderes ist aber
gemeint, wenn man sagt, dass er fUr dolus directus ersten Grades
genUgt, dass der Tater den Taterfolg als Zwischenziel zu seinem-wie
immer gearteten-Endzweck anstrebe" ["The destruction of the group
(in the case of genocide) must serve the motive of the perpetrator. This
is all that is meant when one says that for purposes of first degree dolus
directus it would suffice if the perpetrator strives for making the
consequence of the act as an interim purpose toward his final objective,
however one looks at it."]. Id. at 66. The use of "motive" to denote the
desire of the perpetrator represents an unfortunate choice of words.
40 Note that "malice aforethought" has lost its meaning in English law
and signifies neither malice nor prior knowledge. As an element of
criminal homicide, malice aforethought denotes the intention to kill
(express malice), or the intention to cause grievous bodily harm
(implied malice) irrespective of whether the accused foresaw the
possibility of death setting in or not. See Christopher K Hall, Crimes
Against Humanity, The Different Sub-Paragraphs, in COMMENTARY ON




In the Canadian Case of Regina v. Finta, Justice Cory,
speaking for the majority, stated that "the mens rea requirement
of both crimes against humanity and war crimes would be met if
it were established that the accused was willfully blind to the
facts or circumstances that would bring his or her actions within
the provisions of these offences. '41 The ICTY echoed this view
in Tadi6 (Judgment). 2
Willful blindness is tantamount to knowledge.43 The
very concept indicates that the perpetrator knows-if not as a
certainty in the sense of dolus directus or dolus indirectus, then
at least of the possibility or likelihood-that a certain act has or
may occur or that consequences for which he or she must take
responsibility has or may transpire (dolus eventualis). Willful
blindness denotes the mental disposition of someone who does
not want to know that which he already knows or foresees, and
fakes ignorance in order to escape liability.
Willful blindness will therefore be a strong indication of
at least dolus eventualis or of recklessness and might found
liability in cases where those forms of fault would suffice to
establish accountability. Willful blindness is particularly
relevant in the case of command responsibility. 4 The liability of
a military officer for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC
committed by forces under his or her effective command may be
based on negligence, 45 in which event willful ignorance will not
4 1 R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 819; see also I S.C.R. at 765 (La
Forest, J., dissenting).
42 Prosecutor v. Tadid, supra note 18, 657; see also McAuliffe
deGuzman, supra note 3, at 396, 400.
43 Piragoff, supra note 4, at 535. See also the American MODEL PENAL
CODE, supra note 3, § 2.02(7) (equating "knowledge" to awareness of a
high probability of the existence of a particular fact, unless the
perpetrator "actually believes that it does not exist.").
44 See Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome
Statute, 10 CR. L. F. 1, 18 (1999).
45 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 28(1)(a): The military commander
knew or "should have known" that the forces under his command were
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be an issue since actual knowledge is immaterial for the purposes
of establishing negligence. However, in the case of a non-
military superior, liability for crimes committed by a subordinate
due to the superior official's failure to exercise proper control,
does require that the superior "knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicates" that the subordinates were
committing or were about to commit the crime.46 Willful
blindness could be evidence of actual knowledge, or then at least
of the superior having deliberately turned a blind eye. Here,
dolus eventualis would suffice to secure a conviction.
Willful blindness might also refute the defense of
mistake.47 If ignorance of the perpetrator is attributable to his or
her willful blindness to the facts or the law, he or she cannot
credibly claim ignorance as a defense.
6. Reduced Culpability
If the perpetrator of a crime committed the crime within
the confines of the applicable mens rea requirement in
circumstances that reduces his or her blameworthiness, the latter
fact will be taken into account as a mitigating factor when it
comes to sentencing. Reduced culpability will apply if, for
example, a crime was committed pursuant to an order of a
Government or of a military or civilian superior.48
The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal rejected
superior order as a defense for the crimes within its purview:
"The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsi-
bility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment.
49
committing or about to commit the crime.
46 Id. art. 28(2)(a); see SADAT, supra note 12, at 206-07.
4 7 See infra, F.4
41 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 33.
49 CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, art. 8, in 1
TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG (14 November 1945 - 1 October
1946) 10 (Nuremberg: Int'l Mil. Tribunal) (1949), reprinted in 59 Stat.
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In the Trial of Wilhelm List, the Military Tribunal noted
that the rule that superior order is no excuse is a fundamental
principle of criminal justice that has been extensively adopted by
civilized nations.5 0 Commenting on the attempted defense of
superior order, the Nuremberg Tribunal proclaimed: "The true
test . .. is not the existence of the order, but whether moral
choice was in fact possible.""1
The Nuremberg Trials also show that superior orders
may apply to civilians, and that the rule against upholding a plea
of superior orders was perhaps less rigorously applied where that
was the case. In the Trial of Robert Wagner, Mr. Luger, a Public
Prosecutor, successfully raised the defense of superior orders
imposed upon him by Wagner, the Head of Civil Government in
Alsace, France during the German occupation.52 It is fair to
conclude, though, that international law tended toward
absolutely discarding superior orders as a ground of justification
in cases involving the commission of an international crime. In
Prosecutor v. Erdemovie, McDonald and Yohrah, JJ. endorsed
the following proposition:
We subscribe to the view that obedience to superior
1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Charter of Int'l Military Tribunal].
See also Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of
the Niarnberg [Nuremberg] Tribunal and in the Judgment of the
Tribunal, Principle V, reprinted in 44 A.J I. L. Supp. 126 (1950); see
also Otto Bbhm, Von Niirenberg nach Den Haag-Erfahrungen mit
internationalen Tribunalen, in JAHRBUCH MENSCHENRECHTE 109, at
110-11 (herausg. v. Gabriela von Arnim, et al.) (2000) (singling out
rule that superior order is no defense ss one of the basic legal norms
established by the Nuremberg Trials).
50 United States v. Wilhelm List & Others (The Hostage Cases), in 11
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERENBERG [NUREMBERG]
MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (October
1946 - April 1949) 754, at 1263 (U.S. Gov. Printing Office) (1949).
51 CHARTER OF INT'L MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 49, at 224.
52 Trial of Robert Wagner & Six Others (Case No. 13), in 3 L. REP.
TRIALS WAR CRIMINALS 23, 54-55 (1948).
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orders does not amount to a defence per se but is a
factual element which may be taken into consi-
deration in conjunction with other circumstances of
the case in assessing whether the defences of duress
or mistake of fact are made out.53
By contrast, many national systems uphold the view,
which dates back to the early part of the twentieth century,54 that
a subordinate can rely on a superior order that culminated in the
commission of a crime, but then only (i) if the subordinate knew
or should have known that the order was illegal, or (ii) the order
was manifestly illegal.55 This view also has some support as
being the norm that applies in international law.56
53 Prosecutor v Dra~en Erdemovi6, separate opinion of McDonald and
Yohrah, JJ., , Case No. IT-92-22-A, 34 (7 Oct. 1997), reprinted in
111 I.L.R. 298. For a discussion of the case, see Olivia Swaak-
Goldman, Prosecutor v. Erdemovi, Case No. IT-92-22-A, 92 A.J.I.L
283 (1998).
54 In a December 15, 1930 Judgment, an Austro-Hungarian military
court upheld the view that superior orders would be no defense if the
orders were manifestly illegal. See Paola Gaeta, The Defence of
Superior Orders. The Statute of the International Criminal Court
versus Customary International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 172, 175 n.5
(1999). Subsequently, in Hospital Ship "Dover Castle" and Hospital
Ship "Llandovery, " the court of Leipzig endorsed the principle that
superior orders were not legally justified if the subordinate knew that
those orders would involve committing a military crime or
misdemeanor. Hospital Ship "Dover Castle," reprinted in 16 A.J.I.L.
704, 707 (1922) and Hospital Ship "Llandovery Castle," reprinted in
16 A.J.I.L. 708, 722 (1922).
55 Yoram Dinstein, The Defence of "Obedience to Superior Orders,"
19 INTERNATIONAL LAW, 19 (1965). See also Gaeta, supra note 54, at
175-77.
56 See, e.g., Prosecutor v Erdemovid, supra note 53, 15 (President
Cassese, dissenting: "[I]f the superior order is manifestly illegal under
international law, the subordinate is under a duty to refuse to obey the
order," thereby suggesting that superior order would be a defense if the
order was not manifestly illegal).
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However, the Security Council of the United Nations
upheld the Nuremberg precedent when it established the ICTY
and ICTR. The respective Statutes of the two ad hoc Tribunals
provide in almost identical terms that reliance by an accused
person on an order of a Government or of a superior shall not
relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal
determines that justice so requires. 57 The Torture Convention
likewise provides that "[a]n order from a superior officer or a
public authority may not be invoked as a justification for
torture. ' 8
In Rome, the American delegation attempted to convince
others that superior order ought to be accepted as a valid defense
under the rules of international law, arguing that the position
taken by the Nuremberg Tribunals in this regard was contingent
upon the special circumstances that prevailed in Nazi Germany. 9
The American view was opposed by several delegations, notably
those of Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, who
argued that a subordinate who has been instructed to perform an
act which constitutes a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC
should not be excused but could in appropriate circumstances
raise the defense of mistake or duress.
The two points of view-one asserting that superior
order is no ground of justification at all and the other
proclaiming it to be no defense except if the subordinate did not
know and could not have known that the order was illegal and
57 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY), art. 7(4), Annex, Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993); STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (ICTR), art. 6(4),
Annex, S.C. Res. 955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994).
58 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No.
51 (Dec. 10, 1984), at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), reprinted as
modified in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) and 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
59 Kai Ambos, supra note 44, at 30-31.
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the order was not manifestly illegal-could perhaps be
reconciled if one were to assume that orders to commit a crime
to be prosecuted in an international tribunal would always be
manifestly illegal, while this is not necessarily the case as far as
crimes to be prosecuted in national courts are concerned. But
this, according to some analysts, would amount to an attempt to
"reconcile the irreconcilable." 60 The Rome Conference
nevertheless succeeded at striking a balance between the two
opposing points of view.
The provision in the ICC Statute represents a
compromise between these extreme positions. Article 33 of the
ICC Statute provides as follows:
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court has been committed by a person
pursuant to an order of a Government or of a
superior, whether military or civilian, shall not
relieve that person of criminal responsibility
unless:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to
obey orders of the Government or the
superior in question;
(b) The person did not know that the order was
unlawful; and
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to
commit genocide or crimes against humanity are
manifestly unlawful.
Analysis of this provision will show that the ICC Statute
does not recognize superior orders as an objective ground of
justification at all, 61 because an order to commit an international
60 Gaeta, supra note 54, at 181-83.
61 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 33.
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crime is in itself unlawful. 62 Although two of the three
requirements for upholding a plea of superior orders are factual
or "material" (the legal obligation to obey orders, and the order
being manifestly unlawful) and are therefore to be measured by
objective standards, the remaining one (not knowing that the
order was unlawful) is subjective or "mental." 63  The three
requirements apply cumulatively, and successfully raising the
defense of superior orders therefore depends in the final analysis
on the "mental" component of that defense (guilty knowledge).
The ICC Statute thus accepts superior order as a defense
provided the order was executed by a subordinate in
circumstances that excludes guilty knowledge and therefore
negates the element of fault; and then also only in the case of a
war crime. Superior orders can also be attended by threats that
could substantiate the defense of duress.
The final outcome of the deliberations in Rome
regarding superior orders has been applauded because (i) it rules
out the plea of superior orders for the most egregious
international crimes, and (ii) it proceeds on the assumption that
superior orders are no excuse and then goes on to subjects that
general rule to the one exception founded on the principle of
guilty knowledge as an essential ingredient of fault.
64
Superior orders have been recognized in the Nuremberg
Trials as an extenuating circumstance for sentencing purposes.65
In the Belsen Trial, Dr. Klein, who was instructed to separate
prisoners deemed fit for work from those deemed not fit for
work afforded a rather unique twist to the plea of superior orders
62 Otto Triffierer, Superior Orders and Prescription of Law, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 4, at 573, 579, 587.
63 Per Saland, supra note 16, at 210-11.
64 See Gaeta, supra note 54, at 189-90.
65 See, e.g., The Hostages Cases, supra note 50, at 1236, 1238. See also
Trial of Lieutenant-General Shigeru Sawada & Three Others (Case No.
25), in 5 L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIMINALS 1, 13 (1948); Trial of Carl
Bauer, Ernst Schrameck & Herbert Falten (Case No. 45), in 8 L. REP.
TRIALS WAR CRIMINALS 15, 16 (1948).
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in mitigation of sentence: 66 If a British soldier were to disobey an
order, he would face a Court Martial where he would be given
the opportunity of contesting the legality of his orders, while Dr.
Klein enjoyed no such protection.
Prosecutions in Germany, following its reunification in
November 1989, of persons responsible for the killing or
wounding of refugees from East to West Berlin in the period
1961-198967 are also instructive in this regard. Between 1946
and 1961, approximately 3 million residents of the Deutsche
Demokratische Republik (DDR) left East Germany to escape the
economic hardship and repressive living conditions associated
with Soviet-imposed socialist political control. In 1952, the
DDR authorities began fencing off its territory in East Berlin
with barbed wire in an attempt to block the continuing flow of
border crossings to the West. In August 1961, the construction
of the infamous Berlin Wall commenced as a desperate means of
terminating once and for all the exodus of East German
residents. Border troops were posted along the Wall with strict
instructions to prevent at all costs the "escape" of East German
refugees to "enemy" territory. 68 Between 1949 and 1961, more
than 800 people were killed. Following the construction of the
Berlin Wall, at least 200 refugees were shot dead while
attempting to cross the Wall. Many more were killed, or were
seriously wounded or injured, by land mines. The border troops
consisted for the greater part of young servicemen, and those
66 Trial of Joseph Kramer & 44 Others (The Belsen Case), in 2 L. REP.
TRIALS WAR CRIMINALS 79 (1947).
67 For an overview and in-depth analysis of the facts and circumstances
that prevailed at the time of those prosecutions, see H. Kreicker,
Gewalten an der deutsch-deutschen Grenze, in STRAFRECHT IN
REAKTION AUF SYSTEMUNRECHT 49 (herausg. v. Albin Eser & J6rg
Arnold) (Freiburg i.B.: Max Planck Institut) (2000).
68 The ethos that was to guide their action is encapsulated in the adage:
"Besser der Fluchtling ist tot, als daB die Flucht gelingt." ["Better that
the refugee be dead than that the escape succeeds."], 39 BGHSt 1, 3




who fired at the refugees were expressly praised for their deeds
and received generous promotions.
Following the reunification of Germany in November
1989, criminal charges were brought against border troops,
members of the National Defense Council and officials of the
German Socialist United Party's Politburo. The
Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court) sanctioned the
Mauerschuitzen Entscheidungen (Shooters at the Wall
Decisions)--as those judgments came to be known6-in 1992."
The Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court)
subsequently decided that the prosecutions did not involve any
constitutional obstacles.71
The German criminal courts dealt particularly leniently
with the DDR border troops, imposing fines and suspended
sentences, while imposing terms of imprisonment of up to seven
or eight years in the case of political leaders responsible, as
mediate perpetrators, for sanctioning the shootings. The
extenuating circumstances that prompted the lenient sentences of
the border troops72 included the fact that the accused were young
servicemen (conscripts), the fact that they occupied positions of
subordination at the lower levels of the military hierarchy, and
the fact they received express instructions not to allow any
border crossing to succeed and to kill, if necessary, the refugees.
Nothing is said in the ICC Statute about superior order
being, or not being, a mitigating factor. That is left in the
69 "MauerschUtzen" is not an accurate description of those
prosecutions, since "HintermAnner" (i.e., the perpetrators who
sanctioned or ordered the shootings) were also brought to trial. See
Kreicker, supra note 67, at 49 note 1.
70 39 BGHSt 1, supra note 68.
71 95 BverfGE 96 (24 Oct. 1996), reprinted in 50 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENBLATT, 929 (1997). It might be noted that the major issue that
attended these prosecutions were based on the principle against
retroactivity of criminal sanctions (the shootings were allegedly
sanctioned at the time by lawful instructions). However, that issue is
beyond the scope of this article.
72 See Kreicker, supra note 67, at 97.
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discretion of the Court. 3 In the final analysis, this factor
depends on the extent to which the perpetrator's
blameworthiness was affected by his or her subordination to the
commanding officer or public official.74
C. Mens rea Requirements for the Crime of
Genocide
The element of fault prescribed for the crime of genocide
is a variety of dolus specialis and as such qualifies the acts
through which genocide is committed: the act must be
committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.""
Special intent as an element of genocide will be confined
to dolus directus;7 6 that is, not only the will to bring about the
genocidal consequences of the act but also a desire to do so. The
mental element of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC that
applies "unless otherwise provided," requires that the material
elements of the crime be committed "with intent and
knowledge."" In relation to the consequences of the unlawful
act, intent is satisfied when "the person means to cause the
consequences or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course
73 Triffterer, supra note 63, at 579-80 and 585.
74 Kai Ambos, Impunity and International Criminal Law, 18 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 1, 9 (1997).
75 See Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, 16 (4
Sept. 1998); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 19, 89, 91;
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 19, 59; Prosecutor v. Musema,
supra note 19, 20; Prosecutor v. Baglishema, supra note 28, 60;
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstii, Case No. IT-98-33-T, 571 (2 Aug.
2001). See also Antonio Cassese, Genocide, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ICC, supra note 8, 335, at 338.
76 Steffin Wirth, Zum subjektiven Tatbestand des Vlkermordes-
Zerstorungsabsicht und Vertreibungsverbrechen, in 28 ARGUMENTE
UND MATERIALIEN ZUM ZEITGESCHEHEN 59, at 62-63, 66-67, 71
(Herausg. v. Bemd Rill) (Mtinchen: Akademie ftlr Politik und
Zeitgeschehen) (2001).
77 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 30(1).
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of events. 78 Knowledge in turn is only present if "awareness
that . . . a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of
events" can be demonstrated. 79 The verb used in these passages,
"will occur", includes dolus directus and dolus indirectus but not
dolus eventualis. However, the very special nature of genocide,
and in particular its component of "intent to destroy," leaves no
scope for liability for the principal act in cases of dolus
indirectus.
Alexander Greenawalt has argued that the requirement
of genocidal intent should include instances where "the
perpetrator acted in furtherance of a campaign targeting
members of a protected group and knew that the goal or manifest
effect of the campaign was the destruction of the group in whole
or in part" 8 -- that is, in cases where mens rea takes on the form
of dolus indirectus. Since special intent is an essential element
of genocide and special intent will always require a certain
manifestation of dolus directus, this Proposed transformation of
genocidal intent is way out of line.8 Destruction of the group
will always be the primary objective of the principal perpetrator,
while dolus indirectus applies to secondary consequences
beyond those actually desired by the perpetrator. Dolus
indirectus can, however, lead to a conviction in cases of
complicity in genocide.
82
In terms of the ICC Statute, a military commander can
be held vicariously liable for acts of genocide committed by
members of the armed forces under his or her command. The
criminal liability of the superior officer can, as a general rule, be
based on mere negligence. William Schabas noted that in virtue
of the rule applying to command responsibility, the ICC Statute
seems to allow a lower level of mens rea as a precondition for
78 Id art. 30(2)(b).
'9 Id. art. 30(3).
8o Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case
for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2259, 2288
(1999).
81 See also Prosecutor v. Krsti6, supra note 75, 571.
82 See supra, the text accompanying note 29.
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convicting commanding officers for acts of genocide committed
by their subordinates.8 3 Antonio Cassese disagrees. He contends
that one must distinguish between fault on the part of the actual
perpetrators of genocide (intent to destroy in whole or in part)
and fault attached to the commander's failure to control the
conduct of persons under his or her command. 84 Schabas
actually has the better argument in this regard (though not
explained by him in this way): the commanding officer who did
not know but should have known of the genocidal acts of his or
her subordinates is held vicariously liable for the crime of
genocide and not merely for his failure to exercise proper control
over the persons under his or her command.
There thus seems to be a conflict between the
requirement of special intent for genocide and basing vicarious
command responsibility for acts of genocide on negligence. The
ICC Statute provides that the definition of a crime shall be
strictly construed, and in cases of ambiguity, the definition of a
crime shall be interpreted in favor of the accused.85 A strong
argument can therefore be made for holding that, in view of this
conflict, the general provision applying to command
responsibility must give way to the more stringent element of
fault applying to genocide. In other words, a commanding officer
should not be held vicariously liable for acts of genocide unless
he or she actually became a socius criminis through actual
knowledge of, and a neglect to intervene in, the acts of genocide
committed by persons under his or her command.
Although malice is not a distinct element of the crime of
genocide, 86 it would by virtue of the very nature of genocide
83 William A. Schabas, Genocide, in COMMENTARY ON THE ICC, supra
note 8, at 109.
84 Cassese, supra note 75, at 348.
85 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 22(2).
86 Malice designates the motive that prompted the perpetrators' act-
they sought the destruction, in whole or in part, of the victim group
(intent) because they regarded that group as inferior (motive in the form
of malice). Motive was deliberately eliminated as an element of
genocide. See PIETER N. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: PENAL
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invariably attach to the commission of that crime. Malice would
thus have important evidentiary value in cases of genocide.
Genocidal intent is geared toward the destruction of a
group in whole or in part. In a comment pertaining to its 1996
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, the International Law Commission (ILC) noted the
obvious, namely that for purposes of genocide "[i]t is not
necessary to intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a
group from every corner of the globe.""7  Genocidal intent,
according to the ILC, requires a resolve to destroy at least a
substantial part of the target group.88 The ICTR endorsed these
views,89 noting in particular that "in part" would seem to imply
"a reasonable significant number, relative to the total of the
group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group such as
its leadership." 90 In order to come within the definition of
genocide, individuals who fell victim to the atrocities must have
been targeted because of their membership of the group whose
destruction, in whole or in part, was the ultimate aim of the
perpetrator.91
In 1982, the General Assembly of the United Nations
condemned the large-scale massacre of Palestinian civilians in
the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps situated in Beirut by Israeli
PROTECTION FOR FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF PERSONS AND PEOPLES,
Bk. II GENOCIDE, 83-84, 85 (1959).
87 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
(International Law Commission), in Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
4 8th Sess., Supp. No. 10, 89, 8 (1996), See also Final Report of the
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1999).
88 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 48
'h
Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), 8; see also Prosecutor v. Krsti6,
supra note 75, 590; Wirth, supra note 76, at 67-68.
89 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 19, 95-96.
90 Id. 96.
91 Id. 97. See also Prosecutor v. Baglishema, supra note 28, 61;
Prosecutor v. Krstid, supra note 75, 561.
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forces, calling it an act of genocide.92 Since the Israeli forces
were engaged in military action as a means of combating (or
perhaps retaliating) acts of terror against its population, ascribing
a genocidal intent to those killings is far-fetched. This is not to
say that the attacks did not constitute criminal acts under the
rules of international law, but not genocide.
Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for persons who
(quite rightly) condemn criminal conduct perpetrated by state
action to (unjustifiably) attach a label to that action which would
give it as bad a name as one could possibly conceive, even where
the conduct or condition being condemned does not fit the
essential elements of the label. Proclaiming Zionism to be a
manifestation of racism, 93 and apartheid to be a special instance
of genocide, 94 serve as examples of such attempts to bring the
censure of those practices within the confines of practices with
an exceptionally strong emotional appeal, and thereby
disregarding the true meaning of the concepts denoting those
practices. Overburdening the reach of concepts such as
"genocide" and "racism" may add emotional vigor to one's
92 G.A. Res. 37/123 D, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 38 (Dec. 16,
1982). See also Schabas, supra note 83, at 109-10; Cassese, supra note
75, at 336.
93 See World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Draft Declaration, Proposal made
by the Group of 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.3/7, 62 (July 21,
2001) (proclaiming that "combating . . . [Zionist practices against
Semitism] is integral and intrinsic to opposing all forms of
racism . . ."). See also Id. 63 (referring to "the racist practices of
Zionism"). These allegations were not included in the final Declaration
of the United Nation's World Conference against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban,
South Africa on August 31 to September 8, 2001. See World
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance, Declaration, 57-64, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.189/12
(Jan. 25, 2002).
94 See Violations of Human Rights in South Africa: Report of the Ad




condemnation of other types of evils but ought not to be taken
seriously, for law enforcement purposes, by those charged with
the administration ofjustice.
In cases where genocide consists of the killing of people,
conviction is not dependent on the number of people actually
killed.95 Destruction of the group "in whole or in part" refers to
the perpetrator's intent and not to the extent of destruction that
actually occurred. 96 The Preparatory Committee for an
International Criminal Court, recording the decisions taken at its
session of February 1997, noted that "intent to destroy, in whole
or in part ... a group as such" was understood to refer to "the
specific intention to destroy more than a small number of
individuals who are members of the group." 97 Although the
perpetrators' intention must aim at the destruction of a
substantial number of the target group, 98 they cannot escape
liability for genocide merely because their efforts have been
stifled in the bud by effective law enforcement. If some
members of the target group have indeed been exterminated, the
perpetrators can be convicted of genocide, provided the
requirements of genocidal intent have been proved. If no one has
been killed, the persons engaged in the planning of genocide can
be convicted of attempt to commit genocide.
Provisions in the Elements of Crimes proclaiming that
95 Prosecutor v. Karadiid & Mladik (Rule 61), Cases Nos. IT-95-5-R61
and IT-95-18-R61, 92 (11 July 1996); Prosecutor v. Krstid, supra
note 75, 590; DROST, supra note 86, at 85-86. But see contra,
Cassese, supra note 75, at 345, 349.
96 Prosecutor v. Krstid, supra note 75, 584.
97 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its
Session Held from 11 to 21 February 1997, Annex I, [*3] Crime of
Genocide, at 3 n. 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.5 (March 12, 1997).
98 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 19, 96-97. The statement in
Akayesu that acts of genocide are committed against "one or several
individuals" because of their group identity is, as it stands, misleading.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 28, 520. See also Cassese, supra
note 75, at 348, 349.
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the perpetrator killed, 99 caused serious bodily harm to, 100
inflicted conditions of life upon,1 01 imposed certain measures
upon, 10 2 or forcibly transferred'0 3 "one or more persons" must be
interpreted accordingly. This does not mean that genocide will
be committed if the perpetrator's intent was geared toward the
killing, or the causing of serious bodily harm, etc. of only one
victim. He or she, after all, was prompted by a desire to
contribute toward the destruction, in whole or in part, of the
group to which the victim belonged. To be convicted of
genocide, according to the Elements, at least one person must
actually have fallen victim to the conduct embarked upon by the
perpetrator to achieve that objective. Short of that, the act may
amount to attempt to commit the crime, provided the rather
stringent requirements for attempt laid down in the ICC
Statute104 have been satisfied.
The proof of (special) intent on the part of the accused is
always problematic. In Prosecutor v. Karadii6 & Mladi6 (Rule
61), the ICTY noted that special intent to commit genocide may
be inferred from a number of facts, such as "the general political
doctrine which gave rise to the acts ... or the repetition of
destructive and discriminatory acts . ..the preparation of acts
which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to
violate, the very foundation of the group--acts which are not
covered by the list in . . . [the definition of genocide] but which
are committed as part of the same pattern of conduct."'0 5 In the
case of Akayesu, the ICTR decided that:
... it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent
99 Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, 1st Sess., Official
Record (adopted by the Assembly of States Parties on Sept. 9, 2002)
Part II B, art. 6(a)(1) (2000) [hereinafter Elements].
'°° Id. art. 6(b)1.
'io Id. art. 6(c)l.
02 Id. art. 6(d)I.
03 Id. art 6(e)l.
104 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 25(3)(f).
'o5 Prosecutor v. Karadtid & Mladi4 (Rule 61), supra note 95, 94.
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inherent in a particular act charged from the
general context of the preparation of other
culpable acts systematically directed against the
same group, whether these acts were committed
by the same offender or by others. Other
factors, such as the scale of atrocities committed,
their general nature, in a region or a country, or
furthermore, the fact of deliberately and
systematically targeting victims on account of
their membership of a particular group, while
excluding the members of other groups, can
enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent
of a particular act.
10 6
In Kayishema, the ICTR laid special stress on the
number of group members targeted by the perpetrator as a means
of establishing a genocidal intent. 10 7 In Prosecutor v. Nikoli6
(Rule 61), the ICTY regarded the extreme gravity of
discriminatory acts against a distinct section of the community as
indicative of a genocidal intent.108 Other relevant considerations
include "the physical targeting of the group or their property; the
use of derogatory language toward members of the targeted
group; the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury; the
methodical way of planning, the systematic manner of
killing."' 9 A consistent pattern of conduct received emphasis in
Rutaganda and in Musema. 110 In Prosecutor v. Jelisik, The
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY singled out as indications of a
genocidal intent, "the general context, the perpetration of other
106 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 28, 522; see also Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, supra note 19, 61; Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 19,
166; Prosecutor v. Baglishema, supra note 28, 62.
107 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 19, 93.
108 Prosecutor v. Nikolid (Rule 61), Case No. IT-94-2-R61, 34 (20
Oct. 1995), reprinted in 108 I.L.R. 21 (1998).
109 Id.; see also Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, supra note 19, 62.
110 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, id 63; Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note
19, 163.
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culpable acts systematically directed against the same group, the
scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims
on account of their membership of a particular group, or the
repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts."1"
The objective of genocide as embodied in the
requirement of special intent limits the kind of acts that would
constitute genocide. However, the objective of genocide can
also serve to bring into the confines of the actus reus a broad
perception of killings, the causing of bodily or mental harm,
inflicting conditions of life, preventing births, and transferring of
children. The actus reus may indeed include acts not mentioned
in the definition of genocide but which have been committed as
part of the same pattern of conduct." 2 Massive deportation
(ethnic cleansing) may be construed as a first step in a process of
elimination; destruction of places of worship as a means of
annihilating the religious group associated with those religious
objects; destruction of libraries intended to annihilate the culture
of the target group; systematic rape of women intended to
transmit a new ethnic identity to the child conceived by that
atrocious act-such acts may all become part of the actus reus if
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnic, racial or religious group.'
3
Depicting rape as "a form of genocide directed
specifically at women" 114 has a certain emotional appeal but
cannot serve as a directive for purposes of the juridical meaning
of genocide. Rape can, however, become a constituent part of
genocide provided it is committed as part of the genocidal actus
reus and with genocidal intent.
The judgment of the ICTR in Akayesu illustrates the
point. The tribunal held "rape and sexual violence. . . constitute
genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were
111 Prosecutor v. Jelisid, supra note 38, 47.
112 Prosecutor v. Karadi & Mladi (Rule 61), supra note 95, 94.
113 id.
114 Catherine A. McKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4
U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 65 (1993).
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committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a particular group, targeted as such." 115 In the special
circumstances of that case, rape and sexual violence were
committed as "an integral part of the process of destruction,
specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing
to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a
whole.""116 Rape and sexual violence per se are indeed not
genocide, but where the physical and mental violence committed
against women, who are selected solely because of their national,
ethnic, racial or religious group affiliation, is committed with
genocidal intent, it becomes part of the actus reus and therefore
punishable as acts of genocide.
It is also important to note that the ICTR gave a broad
definition of sexual violence and rape:117
The Tribunal defines rape as a physical invasion
of a sexual nature, committed on a person under
circumstances [that] are coercive. The Tribunal
considers sexual violence, which includes rape,
as any act of a sexual nature which is committed
on a person under circumstances which are
coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to
physical invasion of the human body and may
include acts which do not involve penetration or
even physical contact. The incident.., in which
the Accused ordered the Interahamwe to undress
a student and force her to do gymnastics naked
in the public courtyard of the bureau communal,
in front of a crowd, constitutes sexual violence.
The Tribunal noted that in this context the
coercive circumstances need not be evidenced
115 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 28, 729.
116 id.
117 Id 686. See also Paul J. Magnarella, Some Milestones and
Achievements at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The
1998 Kambanda and Akayesu Cases,1 I FLA. J. INT'L L., 517, 532-36
(1997).
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by a show of physical force. Threats,
intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress
which prey on fear or desperation may constitute
coercion, and coercion may be inherent in
certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or
the military presence of Interahamwe among
refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal.
118
The General Assembly of the United Nations on several
occasions also addressed the advent of rape and sexual violence
committed by, among others, members of the Serbian Forces
against Muslim women in Bosnia and Herzegovina as "a
deliberate weapon of war in fulfilling the policy of 'ethnic
cleansing'," holding that such acts constituted instances of
genocide. 119
D. Mens Rea Requirements for Crimes Against
Humanity
The element of fault pertaining to crimes against
humanity is dealt with in the ICC Statute on three distinct levels:
first, as a general condition of liability applying to all crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC; secondly, as a special element
of all manifestations of crimes against humanity; and thirdly, as
part of the circumscription of particular instances of crimes
against humanity.
1. The General Requirement of Fault
Article 30(1) of the ICC Statute makes criminal
responsibility for any of the crimes within the subject-matter
118 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 28, 689 ("Interahamwe" refers
to "armed local militia.").
119 G.A. Res. 50/192 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49 at 225, U.N. Doc.
A/50/49 (Dec. 22, 1995); see also G.A. Res. 47/121 , U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 49 at 44, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (Dec. 18, 1992); G.A. Res.
48/143 , U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49 at 263, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (Dec.
20, 1993); G.A. Res. 49/205, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49 at 226, U.N.
Doc. A/49/49 (Dec. 23, 1994).
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jurisdiction of the Court conditional upon the material elements
of the crime concerned having been committed "with intent and
knowledge."
When applying the general requirements of fault to
particular crimes against humanity, the ICC will have to take the
judgments of other international tribunals with a pinch of salt.
For example, jurisprudence of the ICTY pertaining to the
requirement of mens rea for murder as a crime against humanity
has not been consistent. In Prosecutor v. Kupregki6, the ICTY
stated:
It can be said that the accused is guilty of
murder if he or she engaging in conduct which is
unlawful, intended to kill another person or to
cause this person grievous bodily harm, and has
caused the death of that person.'
20
The passage relating to the causing of grievous bodily harm
cannot be accepted as an accurate description of "intent and
knowledge" required for murder as a crimes against humanity.
A wrongful act intended to cause grievous bodily harm which
causes the death of the victim will only warrant a conviction of
murder if the perpetrator foresaw the death of the victim as an
inevitable consequence of his or her act (dolus indirectus) or as a
possible consequence of the wrongful act (dolus eventualis); and
furthermore, to qualify as a crime against humanity for ICC
purposes, dolus eventualis will not suffice. The perpetrator must
at least be aware that the death of the victims "will occur" in the
ordinary course of events (dolus indirectus). 121 The above
citation is based on the notion of versari in re illicita, which
ought to have no place in criminal justice systems founded on
the principle of no liability without fault.
As noted earlier, the element of fault required by the ICC
Statute for crimes against humanity includes dolus directus and
120 Prosecutor v. Kupre~kid, supra note 19, 821.
121 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 30(2)(b).
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dolus indirectus only. Although "intentional" killing of a human
being does encompass dolus eventualis, that form of intent will
not suffice where a conviction for murder as a crime against
humanity is at stake. Murder as a crime against humanity
therefore requires that the perpetrator intended the death of the
victim; or, alternatively, if his intention was confined to causing
the victim grievous bodily harm, a conviction for murder as a
crime against humanity will only be warranted if the evidence
shows that the accused knew that death will inevitably result
from his or her act, even though he or she might not have desired
the victim's death.
An intention to inflict serious injury "in reckless
disregard of human life"'2 2 can also not in itself be equated to
"intent and knowledge" as required for crimes against humanity.
The perpetrator's "reckless disregard of human life" would,
however, provide almost irrefutable proof that he knew death
would inevitably result from his wrongful act, thereby satisfying
the demands of dolus indirectus.
In Prosecutor v. Blagki6, the ICTY preferred the French
"meurtre" to "assassinat" as the proper meaning to be attributed
to murder as a crime against humanity, and on that basis decided
that the killing need not be premeditated. 23 It then went on to
recognize dolus eventualis as an acceptable form of intent for
purposes of meurtre, proclaiming that ". . . the accused or his
subordinate must have been motivated by the intent to kill the
victim or to cause grievous bodily harm in the reasonable
knowledge that the attack was likely to result in death."'
124
The ICC is precluded by its circumscription of mens rea
from following these precedents. Christopher Hall thought that
it was possible, though not clear, that knowledge of
circumstances combined with an awareness that those
122 Prosecutor v. Kupre~kid, supra note 19, 823; see also Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, supra note 28, 589; Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalid & Others
(Celebici Case), Case No IT-96-21-T, 430 (16 Nov. 1998) (defined in
the context of war crimes).
123 Prosecutor v. Bla~kid, supra note 6, 216.
124 Id. 217. Emphasis added.
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circumstances would be likely to lead to death (dolus eventualis)
might meet the ICC Statute's requirement of intent and
knowledge for purposes of crimes against humanity.'25 The ICC
Statute, on the contrary, is explicit and clear that intent in
relation to the consequences of an act requires that the
perpetrator was aware that those consequences "will occur" in
the ordinary course of events (dolus directus or dolus indirectus,
depending on whether the perpetrator meant to cause those
consequences or not).126 Even where "knowledge" takes on the
form of "awareness that a circumstance exists" 127 and that
circumstance is the fact that serious bodily harm intentionally
inflicted on the victim is likely to lead to death-and that is the
argument made by Hall-this will not in itself meet the mens rea
requirement for murder as a crime against humanity, because a
conviction for that crime is dependent on intent and
knowledge, 128 and the intent component of this combined
concept excludes dolus eventualis.
The ICTR did have it right in Prosecutor v. Kayishema:
[T]he standard of mens rea required [for murder
as a crime against humanity] is intentional and
premeditated killing. The result is premeditated
when the actor formulated his intent to kill after
a cool moment of reflection. The result is
intended when it is the actor's purpose [dolus
directus], or the actor is aware that it will occur
in the ordinary course of events [dolus
indirectus].129
Article 30(2) of the ICC Statute upholds the distinction made in
125 Christopher K. Hall, Crimes against Humanity, The Different
Paragraphs, in COMMENTARY ON THE ICC, supra note 8, 129 at 130-
31.
126 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 30(2)(b).
127 Id. art. 30(3).
128 Id. art. 30(1).
129 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 19, 139.
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some legal systems between crimes founded on "general intent"
and those-like genocide-of which "special intent" is a
constitutive element.1 30 The latter category of crimes requires an
additional intent requirement beyond the (general) intent
required for the actus reus as such. This additional requirement
relates to the purpose for the commission of the act, an intent to
accomplish a specific result, for example the publication of
allegations intended to bring a particular section of the
community into ridicule or contempt (hate speech). The result-
oriented intent must not be confused with the motive for the
act.131 Intent in all its manifestations has to do with the WHAT
of the perpetrator's mental disposition (i.e., what did the
perpetrator foresee would be the consequences of his or her act,
and in the case of specific intent, what purpose did he or she seek
to achieve). Motive, on the other hand, has to do with the WHY
of the perpetrator's conduct (why would he or she, in the case of
hate crimes, want to bring the target group of his or her act into
ridicule or contempt). It is a specific purpose of, and not the
130 See McAuliffe deGuzman, supra note 3, at 382-83.
131 Id. at 384. This perhaps is a fundamental weakness in the overall
commendable analysis by McAuliffe deGuzman of the element of mens
rea applying to crimes against humanity. It is also wrong to assume
that Absicht in German law necessarily means specific intent. Id at
383. This form of intent merely indicates that the perpetrator did
foresee and desired the consequence of his or her act (dolus directus, or
in German usage, dolus directus in the first degree) in contradistinction
to an alternative form of intent where the perpetrator did foresee the
consequences of his act, either as a certainty (dolus indirectus, or in
German usage, dolus directus in the second degree) or as a distinct
possibility (dolus eventualis), and brings about those consequences
even though he or she did not really desire that result. It is indeed
inconceivable that specific intent would not manifest itself in the form
of dolus directus, but dolus directus also applies to crimes other than
those requiring a specific intent (the perpetrator wants to commit rape
and he does it-general intent for the crime of rape--or the perpetrator
wants to commit rape with a view to affecting the ethnic composition




motive for, the act that renders a specific intent crime
punishable.132
It is also wrong to assume, as did Margaret McAuliffe
deGuzman, 133 that crimes against humanity are in all instances
general intent crimes. The ICC Statute makes allowance for
crimes against humanity that fall in the category of general
intent-crimes as well as crimes against humanity where criminal
liability is dependent upon the act serving as the means for
achieving a certain specified purpose. In the context of crimes
against humanity, the following classification applies in this
regard, provided in each instance the threshold requirements of
the act having to be widespread or systematic and having to be
aimed at any civilian population have been satisfied.
a. General Intent Crimes
Emphasis is on the act constituting a crime against
humanity in the case of murder (the killing of people);
enslavement (exercising the entitlement of ownership over a
person, including the trafficking in persons); deportation or
forcible transfer of population (displacement of persons by
coercive means from the area in which they are lawfully
present); imprisonment (including other means of severely
depriving persons of their physical liberty); and some of the
gender-specific crimes (namely rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, enforced sterilization, or other forms of sexual
violence).
In these instances, the mental element required for
criminal liability is constituted by the accused having meant to
engage in the conduct in question.
134
132 Prosecutor v. Tadid (Judgment), supra note 18, 247-70, 272. See
also Dixon, supra note 19, at 128; Antonio Cassese, Crimes against
Humanity, in COMMENTARY ON THE ICC, supra note 8, 353, at 369.
133 McAuliffe deGuzman, supra note 3, at 379, 381, 388-94.
134 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 30(2)(a).
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b. Specific Intent Crimes
A certain conduct, as well as a distinct purpose,
constitute the essence of the following crimes against humanity:
extermination (here the deprivation of access to food and
medicine or similar life-sustaining resources must be calculated
to bring about the destruction of part of a population); torture
(the act constituting torture, which must be inflicted on the
victim by a person in whose custody or under whose control the
victim finds himself or herself, must bring about severe physical
or mental pain or suffering); forced pregnancy (the unlawful
confinement of a woman who has been forcibly made pregnant
must be calculated to affect the ethnic composition of a
population or must be aimed at carrying out other grave
violations-in the plural--of international law); persecution
(severely depriving persons belonging to a particular group or
collectivity of fundamental rights must be prompted by political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other
grounds universally recognized as impermissible under
international law); 135 the crime of apartheid (the inhumane acts
committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of
systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over
another are only punishable as crimes against humanity if such
acts are committed with the objective of maintaining the racist
regime); and enforced disappearance of persons (the acts
consisting of (i) the arrest, detention or abduction of persons, (ii)
executed by, or with the support or acquiescence of, a state or
political organization, and (iii) attended by a refusal to
acknowledge the arrest, detention or abduction of the
disappeared or to provide information as to their whereabouts,
must be designed to deprive the disappeared from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time).
In these instances, the mental element required for
criminal liability must be established in relation to both the act
135 Cassese seems to suggest that only persecution is a special intent




and the designated purpose of the act: in relation to the conduct,
it must be demonstrated that the accused meant to engage in the
conduct;' 36 and in relation to the consequence of the act, it must
be proved that the accused meant to cause the consequence or
was aware that the consequence will occur in the ordinary course
of events. 37 According to Antonio Cassese, existing case law
has established that the agent of a government or organization
whose policy underscored the commission of a crime against
humanity and who is not directly and immediately involved in
causing the inhumane consequences that constituted the crime
need not anticipate all the specific consequences of his or her
deed, as long as he or she was aware of the risk that his action
might bring about severe consequences for the victim or victims
of the crime.1 38 The ICC Statute does not support this position.
Having to be aware that the consequences will occur in the
ordinary course of events (dolus directus or dolus indirectus)
sets a higher standard of cognizance than merely an awareness of
the risk that certain consequences might ensue from the criminal
act (dolus eventualis).
The distinction made in the ICC Statute in regard to the
mental element pertaining to conduct and the mental element
pertaining to a consequence of the conduct, respectively, is quite
significant. The phrase designating the mental element in the
former context (the accused "means to engage in the conduct")
would, according to general principles of criminal law, include
dolus directus, dolus indirectus, and dolus eventualis. The phrase
designating the mental element that must exist in relation to the
consequences of the act (the accused "means to cause the
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course
of events") covers dolus directus and dolus indirectus only. This
could be interpreted to mean that the crimes against humanity
listed in (a) above can in principle be committed by someone
who did not actually desire to engage in the conduct under
136 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 30(2)(a).
137 Id art. 30(2)(b).
138 Cassese, supra note 132, at 362-63.
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indictment and did not foresee as a certainty that the act engaged
in will entail the conduct which constitutes the crime against
humanity (as long as the occurrence of the crime against
humanity was foreseen as a possibility within the meaning of
dolus eventualis).
There might, however, be another explanation for this
variation in formulation: the concepts of, and distinction
between, dolus directus, dolus indirectus, and dolus eventualis
applies only to intent with regard to the consequences of criminal
conduct, and wording based on those concepts and distinction
would consequently be out of place in the subsection dealing
with the mental element in relation to conduct per se (in
contradistinction to a consequence of criminal conduct). That
this interpretation is to be preferred appears from the following
subsection of the Article dealing with the "mental element".
Under its general provisions, that Article requires that all
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC must, "unless otherwise
provided," be committed "with intent and knowledge." 139
"Knowledge" is defined in the Statute as "awareness that a
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary
course of events.' 140 This definition covers dolus directus and
dolus eventualis only. Even if one were to hold that "intent" in
relation to conduct, as defined in the ICC Statute, includes dolus
eventualis, this form of intentional conduct will be excluded by
the provision requiring "intent" and "knowledge," read with the
above definition of "knowledge".
2. The Particular Requirement of Fault
in the Context of Crimes Against
Humanity
Crimes against humanity are committed against a
civilian population, "pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy;' 4' and to be held criminally liable for
139 CC Statute, supra note 10, art. 30(1).
14°Id. art. 30(3).
"' Id art. 7(2)(a).
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execution of that policy through any of the particular offenses
listed in the ICC Statute as crimes against humanity, the
perpetrator must be shown to have had "knowledge of the
attack." 142 We have established thus far that the general
requirement of fault pertaining to all offences within the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the ICC must be committed "with intent
and knowledge," but that this only applies "[u]nless otherwise
provided."'' 43 Must omission of any mention of intent in the
general definition of crimes against humanity be taken to denote
that only "knowledge" and not "intent" is in general required for
a crime against humanity?
That this could have been the drafters' intention might
also appear from the fact that intent is expressly mentioned as an
element of some of the crimes against humanity (extermination,
torture, forced pregnancy, persecution, apartheid, enforced
disappearance of persons, and other inhumane acts of a similar
character and causing great suffering, or serious injury to body
or to mental or physical health), but not others (murder,
enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population,
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, and
gender-specific crimes other than forced pregnancy).
Seemingly, therefore, the crimes in the first category must be
committed with intent and knowledge, while those in the latter
category requires knowledge but not intent.
There is a certain fallacy in this line of reasoning. The
definition of knowledge ("awareness that a circumstance exists
or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events"'1 44)
presupposes intent and applies language that will cover dolus
indirectus ("awareness that a consequence will occur in the
ordinary course of events"). It makes sense to proclaim that
criminal liability may in certain instances be based on dolus
directus or dolus indirectus and in other instances on dolus
directus only. It does not make sense to conclude that criminal
142Id art. 8(1).
1431 d. art 30(1).
144 Id. art. 30(3).
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liability in certain instances depends on dolus directus and dolus
indirectus but that in other instances dolus indirectus is to be
insisted upon and dolus directus will not suffice. Dolus directus
includes dolus indirectus, but the opposite is not true. Intent is
furthermore implied, as an essential element, of certain crimes
("murder," for example, is per se intentional manslaughter), and
it would therefore not be feasible to conclude that such crimes
require knowledge but not intent.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that intent in the
form of dolus directus or dolus indirectus is an essential element
of all crimes against humanity. The reference to "knowledge of
the attack" in the chapeau of Article 7(1) must, in a word, not be
taken as a substitute for the general provisions of Article 30. In
the case of general intent crimes, the perpetrator must be shown
to have meant to bring about the act or to have been aware that it
would occur in the ordinary course of events (dolus directus or
dolus indirectus) and in the case of special intent crimes, the
additional objective specified in the circumscription of the crime
must also be proved.
In terms of the general dictates of Article 30, the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, including crimes against
humanity, must, to support a conviction, be committed with
"intent and knowledge" relevant to (all] "the material elements"
of the crime. In light of this provision, reference in the chapeau
of the Article defining crimes against humanity to "knowledge of
the attack"-that is, the widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population-seems tautological. It has been
argued, though, that the chapeau was not intended to impact
upon the mens rea requirement, but was inserted in the text as a
jurisdictional directive, intended to confine the ICC's
competence to hear only the more serious cases-those that are
widespread or systematic.145
Requiring that the attack against a civilian population
must be widespread or systematic,l 46 and adding that the crime
145 See McAuliffe deGuzman, supra note 3, at 354, 399.
146 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1).
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against humanity must comprise a course of conduct involving
the multiple commission of the acts constituting the actus reus in
furtherance of a state or organizational policy, 147 serve that
purpose. But adding that the actus reus must be committed
"with knowledge of the attack"148 again confuses the issues. It
would appear that the perpetrator must have positive knowledge
that the act constitutes a widespread or systematic attack against
the civilian population as well as the "intent and knowledge"
relevant to the crime in general. 149 The only question that
remains is how much detailed knowledge of the attack, its
widespread or systematic occurrence, and/or the state or
organizational policy, a perpetrator of crimes against humanity
will be required to have in order to meet the requirement of fault.
In Tadi, the ICTY stated somewhat loosely that the
accused must know "the broader context in which his act
occurs," 150 explaining that the perpetrator must be aware that
there is an attack on the civilian population and know that his or
her acts fit in with the attack.151 In Prosecutor v. Kayishema, the
ICTR in similar vein spoke of "actual or constructive knowledge
of the broader context of the attack, meaning that the accused
must know that his act(s) is part of a widespread or systematic
attack on a civilian population and pursuant to some kind of
policy or plan." 152 It has also been held (in the ICTY) that the
accused need not have sought to achieve all the elements of the
context in which the act was committed as long as he or she
"knowingly took the risk of participating in the implementation
of that context.,
153
141 Id. art. 7(2)(a).
141Id art. 7(1).
149 See Kai Ambos, Der neue Internationale Strafgerichtshof: Die
schwierige Balance zwischen effizienten Strafverfolgung und
Realpolitik, 39 ENTWICKLUNG UND SAMMENWIRKUNG 224, 225 (col. 2)
(1998).
IS0 Prosecutor v. Tadid, supra note 18, 656.
11 Id. 659.
152 Prosecutor v. Kayishema, supra note 19, 134.
153 Prosecutor v. Bla~kid, supra note 6, 251; see also Prosecutor v.
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The ad hoc tribunals seem to confuse the requirement of
knowledge as such with the problem of proving that the
perpetrator actually had knowledge of the act being part of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.
The concept of "constructive knowledge" belongs to the domain
of evidence. As noted in Prosecutor v. Ba§ki, knowledge of the
context in which the offence was committed can be established
with a view to external considerations, such as the historical and
political circumstances in which the act or violence occurred, the
functions and responsibilities of the accused at the time the crime
was committed, the scope and gravity of the acts, and the degree
to which the commission of the crime was a matter of general
knowledge.'5 4 That does not detract one inch from the require-
ment of knowledge in regard to all the constitutive elements of
the crime and not merely of, for example, "some kind of policy
or plan." "Knowledge of the attack," as a requirement of crimes
against humanity for ICC purposes, means knowledge that the
attack is widespread or systematic and is directed against a
civilian population. 5 "Knowledge" means awareness that those
circumstances exist,156 not merely taking the risk of the attack
turning out to be widespread or systematic and directed against a
civilian population.
In his analysis of decisions of the ICTY pertaining to the
mental element required for crimes against humanity in regard to
the threshold requirements for those crimes, Cassese correctly
asserted that negligence would not suffice. However, he then
went on to acknowledge dolus eventualis as a legitimate form of
intent in relation to the threshold requirements of crimes against
humanity: "The awareness, in the agent, of the possibility of
being or becoming instrumental in the execution of a
governmental policy of inhumanity or of a systematic practice of
Kordi6, supra note 19, 183.
154 Prosecutor v. Bla~kid, supra note 6, 251; Prosecutor v. Kordid,
suf ra note 19, 183.
See ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1).
156 Id. art. 30(3).
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atrocities . . . a case of advertant recklessness or dolus
eventualis;" or, as "another possible instance of dolus eventuals,"
"[t]he awareness of the possibility that one's actions are very
likely to result in the preparation of atrocities."' 57 Professor
Cassese noted that the ICC Statute deviated from these
statements of the law. In light of the threshold requirements set
by the ICC Statute for crimes against humanity, said he, "the
requisite mens rea must include the awareness that the individual
criminal act is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a
civilian population."' 158 Here, again, the ICC Statute requires
more than merely knowledge of the possibility or likelihood that
execution of a governmental or organizational policy would
result in any of the atrocities constituting a crime against
humanity.
Since the chapeau of Article 7(1) was intended to be a
jurisdictional provision and not to detract from or add anything
to the mens rea requirement of crimes against humanity, and
based on her (erroneous) premise that crimes against humanity
are in all instances general intent crimes and not special intent
crimes, McAuliffe deGuzman argued that crimes against
humanity merely require knowledge of the connection between
the individual act and a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population; 159 they do not require a specific intent to
participate in the broader attack. 160 The knowledge of the
perpetrator pertaining to the attack need not be detailed in any
way:
[I]t is sufficient for the perpetrator to know
about the existence of an attack directed against
civilians. Culpability for crimes against
humanity does not require that the perpetrator
have any specific knowledge about the contents
157 Cassese, supra note 132, at 364-65.
... Id. at 373.
159 McAuliffe deGuzman, supra note 4, at 391-92.
160 Id at 379.
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of the attack. The perpetrator need not know
that the attack is pursuant to or in furtherance of
a policy, nor must the perpetrator know that the
policy is that of a state or organization. Rather,
the elements elaborated in paragraph 2(a) of
Article 7 are jurisdictional elements intended to
aid judges in determining whether an attack
reaches the level required for a crime of
universal jurisdiction. 6 '
The Elements of Crimes do permit some flexibility in
this regard. Knowledge of a widespread or systematic attack
against the civilian population, according to those directives,
does not require proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all
the circumstances of the attack or the precise details of the plan
or policy under which it was executed.1 62 Persons participating
in the attack at its early stages will be held liable if they intended
to further the attack.1
63
3. The Requirement of Fault in
Particular Instances of Crimes
Against Humanity
Intent is mentioned by name as a distinct element of
some of the crimes against humanity. Here, the language of the
ICC Statute is in some instances also entirely superfluous, but in
others might be quite useful to denote a particular consequence
singled out as an essential component of the crime concemed.
There was no need, for example, to state that
extermination includes "the intentional" infliction of conditions
of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a
population.164 Intent, as we have seen, is already required by
virtue of the general provisions relating to the mental element of
161 Id. at 380.
162 Elements, supra note 99, 2, at art. 2.
163 id.
164 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(b).
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crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, and its mention here
adds nothing to the concept of the crime of extermination. The
same applies to the circumscription of torture as "the intentional"
infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon a
person in the custody or under the control of the accused. 1
65
References to intent does on the other hand make sense
in the case of forced pregnancy, because the actus reus will in
this instance only qualify as a crime against humanity in respect
of which the ICC will exercise jurisdiction if it was committed
"with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any
population or carrying out other grave violations of international
law.', 166 Persecution by the same token requires, as a matter of
definition, a discriminatory intent directed against a group
founded on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender, or other grounds that are universally recognized as
impermissible under international law.1 67 The inhumane acts
constituting the crime of apartheid are only actionable in the ICC
if they were committed "with the intention of maintaining ... [a
certain racist] regime."' 168 Enforced disappearance of persons is
intimately linked to "the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time."' 169 And
finally, under the open-ended clause of the provisions on crimes
against humanity, other inhumane acts will only qualify for ICC
jurisdiction if they are found to be of a similar character than
those mentioned in the ICC Statute and if they have been
committed with the intention to cause "great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health."17
E. Mens Rea Requirements for War Crimes
The mens rea requirements for war crimes raise several
intricate questions, due largely to the fact that drafters of the ICC
165 Id. art. 7(2)(e).
166 Id art 7(2)(f).
167 Id. art 7(1)(h), read with art. 7(2)(g).
168 Id. art 7(2)(h).
'69 Id. art 7(2)(i).
170 Id. art 7(1)(k).
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Statute were more set on maintaining the exact wording of
treaties in force from which the particular war crimes derived
than on maintaining consistency of formulation as required by
the demands of statutory construction.
In spite of a general provision defining mens rea for ICC
purpose, words signifying the element of intent are repeated in
many of the definitions of particular war crimes, and this again
raises the question as to the significance to be attached to that
phenomenon. Special rules apply to the liability of military
commanders for crimes committed by members of the armed
forces under their control. There is an overlap between several
of the crimes against humanity and war crimes, and one must
therefore seek to ascertain whether or not the meaning to be
attached to the crime under the one heading is the same as that
applying to the same crime under the other heading.
1. Deviations from the General
Requirement of Intent and
Knowledge
Section 30 of the ICC Statute bases liability for any of
the crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC on
intent and knowledge, "[u]nless otherwise provided," and
therefore requires close scrutiny of each one of the war crimes
definitions in order to establish whether or not any one of them
falls within the exception to the rule.
a. Redundancies in References to
the Requirement of Intent
Words denoting intent ("willful", "willfully",
"intentionally")171 are repeated in some of the definitions of
particular war crimes. In view of the presumption against the
superfluous use of words in statutory instruments, the question
arises as to the significance to be attached to this seemingly
repetitious usage.
The adverb "willful", "willfully" or "intentionally" is
171 See Piragoff, supra note 4, at n. 19.
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repeated in the definitions of the following war crimes:
* willful killing;
17 2
* willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body or health; 73
* intentionally directing attacks against a civilian
population as such or against individual civilians not
taking direct part in hostilities;
174
* intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects;' 75
* intentionally directing attacks against personnel,
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission;
176
* intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that
such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment
which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated;'
77
* willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected
person of the right to a fair and regular trial;
178
* intentionally directing attacks against buildings
172 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(2)(a)(i).
171 Id art. 8(2)(a)(iii).
'14 Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(e)(i).
175 Id art. 8(2)(b)(ii).
176 Id arts. 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii).
177Id art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
178 Id art. 8(2)(b)(vi).
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dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places
where the sick and wounded are collected, 79
* intentionally directing attacks against buildings,
material, medical units and transport, and personnel
using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions in conformity with international law,
8 1
* intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare by derriving them of objects indispensable to
their survival.'
Michael Bothe has stated that repetition of words denoting
intent in the definitions of particular war crimes denotes that "not
only the actual conduct (e.g. the dropping of a bomb), but also
the consequences (e.g. hitting a civilian object) must be covered
by the intent,"' 82 thereby suggesting that these are special intent
crimes. This assertion is incorrect. In fact, no one of the war
crimes listed above are special intent crimes, and the conclusion
seems inevitable that repeating the element of intent in these
cases add nothing to the general requirement of fault.'83
Another possible explanation would have it that the war
crimes where the element of intent is included in the definition
of the crime could possibly fall under the exceptions provided
for in the general requirement of intent and knowledge that
applies to all crimes "[u]nless otherwise provided.' 84 Must one
assume that in the above instances intent is required but not
knowledge? This would really make no sense, because the
"9 id. arts. 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv).
"o Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxiv) and 8(2)(e)(ii).
181 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).
182 Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in 1 COMMENTARY ON THE ICC, supra
note 8, 370, at 389.
183 See SADAT, supra note 12, at 162, 210-11.
184 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 3 0(1).
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essential element of knowledge (being aware that a circumstance
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of
events)' 85 explicates dolus indirectus, which is already included
in the definition of intent (being aware that a consequence will
occur in the ordinary course of events).
1 86
It is therefore submitted that the element of intent is here
redundantly repeated in the definition of the war crimes
concerned and that this redundancy is entirely attributable to
definitions being taken from existing treaties in force and the
drafters' resolve to retain that language as far as possible.
b. Command Responsibility
Military commanders can be held liable for war crimes,
which they themselves committed. They can also in certain
circumstances be held vicariously liable for war crimes
committed by the troops under their command.
Criminal liability of a commanding officer for
personally committing a war crime is subject to the general mens
rea requirement of intent and knowledge or the alternative
manifestation of fault that applies to the particular crime.
Applying the law to the facts in any particular case requires
special circumspection. There are a number of war crimes,
namely, that are not merely founded on objective facts of
empirical reality but which require evaluation of a situation and
subjective judgments of the appropriate course of action. Those
crimes include extensive destruction and appropriation of
property "not justified by military necessity"; 187 launching an
attack that would cause incidental loss of life or injury to
civilians or collateral damage to civilian objects "which would
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated"; 188 and widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the natural environment "which would be
1'85 Id. art. 30(3).
186 Id art. 30(2)(b).
187 Id art. 8(2)(a)(iv); see also id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xiii) and 8(2)(e)(xii).
188 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
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clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated."' 89 Judgments made by military
officers as to a "military necessity" or a "military advantage
anticipated" and calculations of the proportionality of the loss of
civilian lives or injuries, or the damage to civilian objects or the
natural environment, must never be evaluated in hindsight, 9 ° in
the rational setting of arm-chair reasoning, or through the
dispassionate neutrality of a court-room setting. In The Hostage
Case, the Military Tribunal stated that in establishing the guilt or
innocence in this context of an army commander "the situation
as it appeared to him must be given the first consideration,"'
19'
and later on in the judgment went on to say:
There is evidence in the record that there was no
military necessity for this destruction and
devastation [of villages, bridges and highways,
and of communication lines and postal
installations in Norway]. An examination of the
facts in retrospect can well sustain this
conclusion. But we are obliged to judge the
situation as it appeared to the defendant at the
time. If the facts were such as would justify the
action by the exercise of judgment, after giving
consideration to all the factors and existing
possibilities, even though the conclusion reached
may have been faulty, it cannot be said to be
criminal.
92
As far as vicarious liability is concerned, the ICC Statute
distinguishes between two categories of superiors who might be
held liable for crimes committed by a subordinate.' 93 The first
189 Id.
190 William J Fenrick, War Crimes, Article 8,Para. 2(a), in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 4, 180, at 183.
191 The Hostages Cases, supra note 50, at 1245-46.
192Id at 1296.
193 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 28. See generally SADAT, supra
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category consists of military commanders 194 and persons
effectively acting as military commanders, 195 and the second
category consists of other persons in a position of authority.
196
The ICC Statute makes a clear difference between the element of
mens rea required for vicarious liability of a military superior
and a civilian superior (respectively): while the military superior
"knew or should have known" and liability can thus be based on
negligence, the civilian superior can only be held liable for the
criminal acts of his or her subordinates if he or she "consciously
disregarded information which clearly indicated . . .," which
denotes intent. 97 In both instances liability may derive from a
mere omission.198
Leila Sadat maintained that "knew or should have
known" and "conscious disregard" suggest "something less than
'intent,' such as criminal negligence or recklessness."' 99 This is
misleading. If someone knew, he or she acted intentionally; if
someone should have known, he or she acted negligently; and
willful blindness ("conscious disregard") is again indicative of
intent (the perpetrator knew but did not want to know).
As a general rule, a military commander or the person
effectively acting as a military commander is criminally liable
note 12, at 203-08.
194 A military commander is a member of the armed forces assigned to,
or who assumed, command over one or more units of the armed forces.
William J. Fenrick, Responsibility of Commanders and Other
Superiors, in COMMENTARY ON THE ICC, supra note 8, 515, at 517.
195 Persons effectively acting as a commanding officer include police
officers in command of armed police units, persons responsible for
paramilitary units not incorporated in the armed forces and persons
who have assumed de facto control of armed forces, police units, or
paramilitary units. Id. at 517-18.
196 Other persons in a position of authority include "political leaders and
other civilian superiors in a position of authority." Prosecutor v. Delali,
supra note 122, 356; see also Fenrick, supra note 195, at 521.
197 See Per Saland, supra note 16, at 204.
198 See SADAT, supra note 12, at 203.
'99 Id. at 207.
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for any of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC
committed by forces under his or her effective command and
control, or in the case of a person effectively acting as a military
commander by forces under his or her authority and control. 00
However, this only applies if the military commander or person
effectively acting as a military commander:
* failed to exercise proper control over the forces under his
or her command and control;
* knew, or in the prevailing circumstances should have
known, that the forces were committing, or were about
to commit, a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC;
and
* failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures
within his or her power to prevent or to repress the
commission of the crime or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and
201prosecution.
In the absence of direct evidence as to the superior
officer's knowledge of the offenses committed by his or her
subordinates, actual knowledge can be construed in view of
indicia such as the number of illegal acts, the type of illegal acts,
the scope of illegal acts, the time during which the illegal acts
occurred, the number and type of troops involved, the logistics
involved (if any), the geographical location of the acts, the
widespread occurrence of the acts, the tactical tempo of
operations, the modus operandi of similar illegal acts, the
officers and staff involved, and the location of the commander at
202the time.
200 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 28(1).
201 Id.
202 Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N.
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The provisions in the ICC Statute pertaining to
command responsibility are open to criticism. Thomas Weigend
transcribed the above requirements for command responsibility
into several hypotheticals
20 3
(i) The military commander (MC) neglected his
or her duty to exercise control over the forces
under his or her command (FC); MC did not
foresee the unlawful act committed by FC, but
should have foreseen the act.
(ii) MC sought to prevent the act of FC, but
failed to take all necessary and reasonable steps
to do so, and FC committed the act.
(iii) MC could not prevent the act of FC, but did
not after the event submit the matter to the compe-
tent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
Each one of these set of facts, according to Weigend, would not
warrant prosecution and conviction of the superior military
officer for the crime committed by his or her subordinate. °4 The
first example would not warrant prosecution because the
commanding officer did not foresee the act. The second example
would not warrant prosecution because the commanding officer
was only negligent in exercising his duty to prevent the act, and
his involvement in the crime amounted to no more than
assistance through an omission. The third example would not
warrant prosecution because neglect of the commanding officer
amounts to no more than obstructing the ends of justice through
SCOR, Annex, at 17 (May 27, 1994), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994).
See also Prosecutor v. Delali, supra note 122, 386.
203 Thomas Weigend, Zur Frage eines "Internationalen" Allgemeinen
Teils, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR CLAUS ROXIN ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 15.
MAI 2001, 1375, at 1396. (Walter de Gruyter, ed., 2001).
204 Id. at 1396-97.
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an omission. Overall the problem is that a neglect of duty (a
crime in its own right) is translated into a crime of quite a
different kind-a crime which the commanding officer did not
commit, attempted to commit, ordered, solicited or induced, or
assisted through aiding and abetting.
Nor could the military officer who has been prosecuted
for neglect of duty raise the defense of ne bis in idem (double
jeopardy) if subsequently he or she were to be charged to stand
trial in the ICC for the war crime that was defacto committed by
his or her subordinate. Ne bis in idem excludes a second trial in
the ICC (but not in a national court) for the same conduct, and
the omission constituting a neglect of duty, and for example the
killing of innocent civilians, are not the same conduct.
The Nuremberg Trials provide authority for the
proposition that a superior officer who knows that troops under
his or her command were violating international law upon
instructions of the superior officer's own superior will also be
vicariously liable for the illegal act. In the High Command Case,
the Tribunal held that "by doing nothing he cannot wash his
hands of international responsibility." 2 5 In another case,
General Tomoyuki Yamashito was held criminally liable for
widespread and repeated atrocities committed by Japanese
soldiers under his command in the Philippines exactly because
he failed to provide effective control of his troops as could be
expected of him under the circumstances.0 6 The United States
Military Commission in Manila had this to say about command
responsibility:
Clearly, assignment to command military troops
is accompanied by broad authority and heavy
205 Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb & Thirteen Others (Case No. 72), 12 L.
REP. TRIALS WAR CRIMINALS 73-74 (1949). The Tribunal recognized
the difficulties that the intermediary superior officer will inevitably face
in these circumstances and accepted his or her predicament as an
extenuating circumstance for purposes of sentence.




responsibility. . . . It is absurd, however, to
consider a commander a murderer or rapist
because one of his soldiers commits a murder or
a rape. Nevertheless, where murder and rape
and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread
offences, and there is not effective attempt by a
commander to discover and control the criminal
acts, such a commander may be held
responsible, even criminally liable, for the
lawless acts of his troops, depending upon their
nature and the circumstances surrounding
them.2 °7
The Tribunal went on to state the obvious: "Should a
commander issue orders which lead directly to lawless acts, the
criminal responsibility is definite and has always been so
understood. 2 °8
C. War Crimes Requiring Dolus
Directus
Extensive destruction and appropriation of property
constitutes a war crime, provided the destruction and
appropriation was not justified by military necessity and was
furthermore carried out "unlawfully and wantonly." 20 9 The
wanton destruction or appropriation of property adds a
dimension to the element of intent, designating a reckless
disregard of the rights of others. The mental attitude of the
perpetrator acting wantonly would almost inevitably include the
desire to destroy or to appropriate the property concerned and
27Id at 35. See also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, at 16 (1946) (U.S.
Supreme Court held, in a habeas corpus application in the same matter,
that a commanding officer is under "an affirmative duty to take such
measures as were within his power and appropriate in the
circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population"
against excesses committed by the troops under his command.).
208 Trial of Yamashita, supra note 206, at 35.
209 1CC Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(2)(a)(iv).
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would most likely be interpreted to require dolus directus.
The same would apply to the war crime of killing or
wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army.210 It would also apply in cases of armed conflicts
not of an international character, to killing or wounding
treacherously a combatant adversary, 21' and to other instances of
perfidy.
212
Belligerents would always try to out-smart one another
through superiority in military skills and weaponry,
reconnaissance, and resourceful strategies. Resourceful strategies
become treacherous, and therefore criminal conduct, if the
belligerent creates a false impression regarding his or her
reliability or the safety of his or her adversary. Perfidy in all its
manifestations 21 3 includes the notion that the perpetrator through
his or her treacherous act invited the confidence of an adversary
to lead him or her to believe that the perpetrator is entitled to, or
that the adversary is obliged to accord, protection under the rules
of international law applicable in armed conflict. 24 According
210 Id. art 8(2)(b)(xi).
211 Id art 8(2)(e)(ix).
212 Id art 8(2)(b)(vii) (making improper use of a flag of truce, of the
flag or military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United
Nations, or of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions).
213 Perfidy does not include ruses of war. Ruses of war is defined in
Protocol I as "acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to
induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international
law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because
they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to
protection under that law." Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), art. 37(2), U.N.
Doc. A/32/144, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 21-22 (Aug. 12, 1949), reprinted in
16 I.L.M. 1391, 1409 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]. Ruses of war
include the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and
misinformation. Id.
214 Elements, supra note 99, 1, at art. 8(2)(b)(xi); see also Dieter
Fleck, Ruses of War and Prohibition of Perfidy, 13 REVUE DE DROIT




[W]henever a belligerent has expressly or tacitly
engaged, and is therefore bound by a moral
obligation, to speak the truth to an enemy, it is
perfidy to betray his confidence, because it
constitutes a breach of trust. Thus a flag of truce,
or the cross of the Geneva Convention, must
never be used for a stratagem; capitulation must
be carried out to the letter; the feigning of
surrender to lure the enemy into a trap, the
assassination of enemy commanders, soldiers, or
heads of State, are treacherous acts.215
The Lieber Code addressed the question of deception as a war
strategy in compelling terms:
While deception in war is admitted as a just and
necessary means of hostility, and is consistent
with honourable warfare, the common-law of
war allows even capital punishment for clandes-
tine or treacherous attempts to injure an enemy,
because they are so dangerous, and it is difficult
to guard against them.2 16
Michael Bothe, Knut Ipsen & Karl Josef Partsch, Die Genfer Konferenz
ulber humanitdres V6lkerrecht: Verlauf und Ergebnisse, 38
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 1, 24-25 (1978).
215 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, 165, at 430 (7th
ed., 1952).
216 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in
the Field, (Proposed by Frances Lieber, Promulgated as General Order
No. 100 by President Lincoln), art. 101 (April 24, 1863), reprinted in
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jifi Toman
eds., 1988), reprinted in I THE LAWS OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, 158 (Leon Friedman. ed., 1972).
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Article 37 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 provides as follows:
1. It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an
adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the
confidence of an adversary to lead him to
believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to
accord, protection under the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict,
with intent to betray that confidence, shall
constitute perfidy. The following acts are
examples of perfidy:
(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate
under a flag of truce or of surrender;
(b) the feigning of an incapacitation by
wounds or sickness;
(c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant
status; and
(d) the feigning of protected status by the
use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the
United Nations or of neutral or other
States not Parties to the conflict.
2 17
The examples listed in Article 37 of Protocol I serve as a useful
guide of treacherous acts that would invoke ICC jurisdiction
under the present heading, should such acts be resorted to with
intent to kill or to wound the enemy and indeed have that result.
In a paper submitted to the Preparatory Commission for
the International Criminal Court, the ICRC distinguished the
following material elements of this crime:
(1) The perpetrator killed or injured [or
captured] a person belonging to the
adverse party.
217 Protocol I, supra note 213, art. 37.
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(2) The act in question was of a nature to
cause or at least induce the confidence
of that person.
(3) The confidence was based on a legal
protection prescribed by rules of
international law applicable in armed
conflict, which that person himself is
entitled to or which he is obliged to
accord.21 8
A typical example would be if the treacherous party pretends to
be a member of the armed forces of the enemy in order to kill or
to wound members of the enemy forces. In his comments on the
original provision in the Hague Convention No. IV, Oppenheim
noted that "no assassin must be hired, and no assassination of
combatants be committed; a price may not be put on the head of
an enemy individual; proscription and outlawing are prohibited;
no treacherous request for quarter must be made; no treacherous
simulation of sickness or wounds is permitted., 219 Greenspan
added to these instances of treachery, the simulation of death and
pretended surrender "for the purpose of putting the enemy off his
guard and then attacking him."
220
The element of treachery included in these crimes would
render any form of mens rea short of dolus directus inapplicable.
218 The ICRC document was submitted to the Preparatory Commission
by the governments of Belgium, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary, the
Republic of Korea, South Africa, and the Permanent Observer Mission
of Switzerland to the United Nations. See U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.2/Add. 1 (July 30, 1999).
219 OPPENHEIM, supra note 215, 110, at 341.
220 MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE, 317
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press) (1955).
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2. Torture as a Special-Intent War
Crime
Torture has been listed in the ICC Statute as a crime
against humanity 221 and as a war crime. 222 It has been defined in
the ICC Statute for purposes of crimes against humanity only,
namely as "the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or
under the control of the accused," excluding the pain and
suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful
sanctions.223 Since torture as a war crime is not defined in the
ICC Statute, its definition must for that purpose be based on the
common-law concept of torture. There is authority for the
proposition that torture as defined in the Torture Convention
224
reflects the customary-law meaning of that concept and should
be applied for purposes of its prohibition in humanitarian law. 25
In fact, the Elements of Crimes clearly based its
circumscription of torture as a war crime on the definition of
torture in the Torture Convention. Torture occurs, according to
the war-crimes provisions of the Elements, when severe physical
or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on one or more persons
for such purposes as "obtaining information or a confession,
punishment, intimidation or coercion or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind." 226 The Convention definition of
torture must evidently be adapted to suit the contingencies of
armed conflict. For the purposes of ICC jurisdiction, the act of
torture as a war crime must, for example, be committed "in
particular ... as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-
scale commission of such crime, ,227 and since armed conflicts
may include non-governmental armed forces, the infliction of
221 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(f).
222 Id. art. 8(2)(a)(ii).
223 Id art. 7(2)(e).
224 Torture Convention, supra note 58, art. 1,
225 See Prosecutor v. Delalid, supra note 122, 459; see also Prosecutor
v. Anto Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-I.T, 160-61 (10 Dec. 1998).
226 Elements, supra note 99, 2, at art. 8(2)(a)(ii).
227 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(1).
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severe pain or suffering by officials of such non-governmental
participants in a conflict ought also to be included in the concept
of torture for the purposes of humanitarian law.228
There are two basic differences between the definition of
torture in the Torture Convention and the one contained in the
ICC Statute (for the purposes of crimes against humanity):
" The Torture Convention defines torture as the
infliction of severe pain and suffering for a particular
purpose, such as obtaining from the victim or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him
or her for an act which he or she, or a third person,
has committed or is suspected of having committed,
or intimidating or coercing him or her, or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind,
* The Torture Convention requires that the pain and
suffering be inflicted by or at the instigation, or with
the consent or acquiescence, of a public official.
The purposive element of intimidation, coercion, punishment or
discrimination built into the Convention definition of torture was
intended to exclude "private conduct." 229 It is almost
inconceivable that severe pain and suffering by or at the
instigation, or with the consent or acquiescence, of a public
official would not be torture.
230
For purposes of the present survey it is important to note
that the definition of torture as a war crime (derived from the
Torture Convention) is a special intent crime, while this is not
the case as far as torture as a crime against humanity is
concerned.
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F. Grounds of exculpation
In criminal law, there are a category of defenses called
"grounds ofjustification," which would deprive an act that in the
normal course of events would be unlawful of its illegality.
Those mentioned in the ICC Statute include defensive action,
duress, necessity, and superior orders. A second category of
defenses comprises grounds of exculpation. They exclude or
diminish the ability of a person to form an intent, is subjective in
nature, and thus have a bearing on the element of mens rea.
Some legal systems place an onus on the accused who
raises a defense to prove (normally on a balance of probabilities)
the facts upon which the concerned ground of justification or
exculpation are based, especially if those facts are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the accused. The ICC Statute does not
subscribe to this view-and for that it has been criticized by
common-law jurists not fully committed to the presumption of
innocence as a basic rule of criminal justice.
231
In terms of the ICC Statute, everyone shall be presumed
innocent until proven guilty. 232 The onus of proving the guilt of
the accused rests on the Prosecutor,233 and the prosecution must
convince the Court beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.234 The ICC Statute expressly provides that the accused
231 See SADAT, supra note 12, at 147, 215.
232 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 66(1).
233 Id. art. 66(2).
2341d. art. 66(3). The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia and the Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda do not specify that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required
but only contain general directives, for example that the accused must
be proved guilty "according to the provisions of the present Statute."
ICTY Statute, supra note 57, art. 21(3); ICTR Statute, supra note 57,
art. 20(3). However, the respective Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
the two Tribunals do require for a conviction that "guilt has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt." Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
the International Criminal Tribunal, Rule 87, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 13,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF
PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
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shall not have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden
of proof or any onus of rebuttal. 35 In cases where the facts
relied upon to substantiate a ground of justification or
exculpation are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused,
the ICC may impose an obligation to produce evidence on the
defense, but this is not an onus of proof. At the end of the day,
the guilt of the accused must appear beyond a reasonable doubt
from all the facts placed before the Court by the prosecution and
the defense team.
The ICC Statute specifies the following grounds for
exculpation.
1. Mental Disorder
A person suffering from a mental disease or defect that
destroys that person's capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or
nature of his or her conduct, or the capacity to control his or her
conduct to conform to the requirements of law, cannot be convic-
ted by the ICC for any of the crimes within its jurisdiction.236
The ICC Statute thus recognizes the principle that a
person cannot be held criminally liable if he or she, due to a
mental disease or defect, cannot appreciate the nature of his or
her conduct. It also recognizes the principle that absence of
HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991, BASIC DOCUMENTS 29, 130 (1998); Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
Rule 87, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.2 (July 5, 1996), reprinted in VIRGINIA
MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, 2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 19, 55 (1999); and see Hfikan Friman, Rights
of Persons Suspected or Accused of a Crime, in THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE, supra note 16, 247, at 250.
235 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 67(1)(i).
236 Id. art. 31(1)(a). See also Andreas Zimmermann, Die Schaffng
eines stiindigen Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes: Perspektiven und
Probleme vor der Staatenkonferenz in Rom, 58 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 47, 82
(1998).
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guilty knowledge negates the capacity of a person to
intentionally act unlawfully. If one is unable to appreciate the
unlawfulness of one's conduct, one cannot be said to be breaking
the law intentionally. Furthermore, the ICC Statute sided with
those legal systems where irresistible impulse-the inability, by
virtue of a mental disease or defect, to control one's conduct to
conform to the requirements of the law-excludes liability for
offences of which intent is an essential element.
The ICC Statute, on the other hand, only recognizes the
exclusion of intent and knowledge in cases where the mental
disease or defect is in the nature of a lasting condition.237 The
rather dubious notion of "temporary insanity" recognized in
some legal systems as a ground of exculpation is therefore not
part of the ICC's accountability philosophy. A mental condition
that does not destroy but nevertheless diminishes the capacity of
the perpetrator to appreciate the wrongfulness of the actus reus
or to act in accordance with his or her perception of right and
wrong would not be an excuse but would invariably serve as an
extenuating circumstance.238
2. Intoxication
Being in a state of intoxication that destroys the
intoxicated person's capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or
nature of his or her conduct, or the capacity to control his or her
conduct to conform to the requirements of law, excludes liability
for any of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, unless
the perpetrator has become intoxicated under such circumstances
that he or she knew, or should have known, or disregarded the
risk, that as a result of the intoxication, he or she was likely to
engage in conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of
the ICC.
23 9
237 Albin Eser, Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 4, 537, 546 (reading
this into the wording of art. 31(1) of the ICC Statute, which requires
that the person "suffers" from a mental disease of defect).
2. Id. at 546.
239 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 3 1 (l)(b).
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Here, again, the principle requiring the ability to form an
intent, grounding criminal liability on guilty knowledge and
excluding criminal liability on grounds of irresistible impulse, is
recognized by the ICC Statute. In this instance, though,
(voluntary) intoxication in special circumstances will not
exclude criminal liability.
The question whether or not intoxication ought to be
recognized as a circumstance that excludes dolus was highly
controversial. 240 Arab States committed to Islamic law
considered the excessive use of alcohol an aggravating
circumstance, while delegations schooled in Western perceptions
of accountability considered intoxication as a mitigating factor or
even one that would altogether exclude intent and knowledge.
To bridge the gap, a footnote was recorded in Rome, declaring
''voluntary intoxication as a ground of excluding criminal
responsibility would generally not apply in cases of genocide or
crimes against humanity, but might apply to isolated acts
constituting war crimes.', 41
In principle, intoxication in certain circumstances ought
not to exonerate a person for crimes committed while in a state
of intoxication that renders that person doli incapax, negates his
or her ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her
conduct, or instills in him or her the irresistible impulse to act
unlawfully. Two such sets of circumstances can be
distinguished:
if the person decides to commit a crime while being
sober and then becomes intoxicated in order, for
example, to pluck up Dutch courage to do it (actio
libera in causa); or
240 Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome
Statute, 10 CR. L.F. 1, at 25 (1999); Eser, supra note 237, at 546.
241 Report of the Working Group on General Principles of Criminal
Law, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. I 83/C. 1/WGGP/L.4./Add. 1/Rev. 1, n.8 (July 2,
1998).
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* if the person becomes intoxicated while knowing, or
disregarding the risk, that he or she might commit a
crime while in a state of intoxication.
In their attempt to capture these two instances of
criminal responsibility of an intoxicated person, drafters of the
ICC Statute, by inserting the phrase "as a result of the
intoxication," went about their business rather clumsily. The
actio libera in causa is not committed "as a result of the
intoxication"; nor necessarily is the crime committed by the
person who became drunk while knowing that he or she might
commit a crime while in a state of intoxication or in reckless
disregard of that possibility. The formulation of the provision
under consideration in the ICC Statute applies to crimes of which
intoxication itself is an element, such as driving a motor vehicle
under the influence of an intoxicating substance. Those are the
type of crimes committed "as a result of the intoxication," and
hardly apply to any of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
ICC.
The actio libera in causa, or the crime committed by the
person who became drunk while knowing that he or she might
commit a crime while in a state of intoxication or in reckless
disregard of that possibility, was not committed "as a result of
the intoxication." It should, in this writer's respectful opinion,
nevertheless remain punishable under the ICC Statute. The ICC
ought to apply the law generally recognized in this regard under
its authority to apply "general principles of law derived ... from
national laws of legal systems of the world. 242 Although the
ICC is restricted in this regard to principles of law that are not
inconsistent with, inter alia, the ICC Statute,243 the provision
requiring that the crime committed while the perpetrator was in a
state of intoxication must be one committed "as a result of the
intoxication" does not contradict the principle applying to, for
example, the actio libera in causa. The provision under




consideration postulates an instance of criminal liability of an
intoxicated person alongside his or her liability, in terms of
general principles of law, for an actio libera in causa or for a
crime committed by the person who became intoxicated while
knowing that he or she might commit a crime while in that state
or in reckless disregard of that possibility.
A person seeking exculpation for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the ICC must show that the circumstance relied
upon to exclude liability was present "at the time of that person's
conduct. 244 Some analysts regard this condition, by excluding
the time at which the statutory result of the conduct sets in, as "a
rather narrow view., 241 If the aider and abetter was doli incapax
by reason of intoxication at the time of providing the means for
the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC
246
but sobered up by the time the crime was actually committed,
should he or she not be held criminally responsible for
facilitating the commission of the crime if he or she failed to
interrupt the actus reus?
3. Juvenile Status
The ICC Statute does not expressly deal with the
influence of tender age upon the capacity of a person to form a
criminal intent. Nor was it necessary to do so because the ICC
only has jurisdiction over persons 18 years of age or older.247
In the current state of international humanitarian law,
children of 15 years and older may be deployed in armed
combat. Restricting the jurisdiction of the ICC to persons over
the age of 18 years while children under that age, but over 15
years of age, might as members of the armed forces commit war
crimes does appear to be an anomaly. 248 However, it would be
244 1d. art. 31(1).
245 Eser, supra note 237, at 545.
246 See ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 25(3)(c).
2471d art. 26.
248 Roger S. Clark & Otto Triffterer, Exclusion of Jurisdiction Over
Persons Under Eighteen, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE,
supra note 4, 493, at 497-98.
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wrong to assume that restricting the jurisdiction of the ICC
ratione personae to persons over the age of 18 years "can, in
substance, be considered as a ground for excluding criminal
responsibility as well. 249 Under the complementarity regime,
States remain obligated to bring perpetrators of war crimes to
justice within their municipal legal system and based on the
decrees of their domestic criminal law. Needless to say, if a
child between the ages of 15 and 18 years were to commit a war
crime, he or she was most likely prompted or even coerced to do
so through the example or instructions of an adult comrade in
arms or commanding officer.
4. Mistake
There are certain mistakes which exclude intent to
commit a crime, while certain others do not affect the capacity of
the perpetrator to intentionally break the law but nevertheless
excludes criminal responsibility. Only the first category has an
impact on application of the principle of no liability without
fault.
A mistake can consist of being unaware of a particular
matter that does exist or a miscalculation of a prevailing state of
affairs.250 For the purposes of the present survey the matter or
state of affairs can either be a certain fact, event or condition, or
a rule of law.
2 51
Some legal systems of the world apply the adage:
ignorantiafacti excusat, ignorantia iuris non excusat (an error of
fact is an excuse, an error of law is no excuse).252 The premise
that ignorance of the law is no excuse is inconsistent with the
249 See Eser, supra note 237, at 541.
250 See Otto Triffterer, Mistake of Law and Mistake of Fact, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 4, 555, at 565.
251 For an overview of the different manifestations of mistake, see
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, 684-85 (Oxford
Univ. Press) (2000).
252 This view suggests that only a mistake of fact implicates mens rea.
See FLETCHER, id n.241, at 687; SADAT, supra note 12, at 217-18;
Ambos, supra note 240, at 29.
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principle of no liability without fault and its concomitant decree
requiring guilty knowledge as a precondition for criminal
liability based on intentional conduct.25 3 If a person is unaware
of the fact that he or she is acting unlawfully, it should make no
difference in principle whether that lack of knowledge is based
on a misconception of the facts or on ignorance of the law. And,
as noted by George Fletcher:
In a pluralistic society, saddled with criminal
sanctions affecting every area of life, one cannot
expect that everyone know what is criminal and
what is not. The problem is compounded in
some fields, such as abortion and obscenity, by
constantly changing standards of permissible
conduct.
254
The ICC Statute in this regard recognizes ignorance of the facts
as well as ignorance of the law as a legitimate ground for
excluding criminal liability.
The language selected by the Drafters nevertheless
seems to distinguish between error facti (mistake of fact) and
error iuris (mistake of law). "A mistake of fact," according to
the ICC Statute, "shall be a ground for excluding criminal
responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by
the crime.,, 211 "A mistake of law may ... be a ground of
excluding liability if it negates the mental element required by
such a crime [within the jurisdiction of the Court]." 256 This
253 In 1977, the South African Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
(as it was then called) decided "[a]t this stage of our legal development,
it must be accepted that the clich6 proclaiming that 'every person is
presumed to know the law' has no raison d'etre and that in view of the
contemporary concept of fault in our legal system the notion that
'ignorance of the law is no excuse' cannot be upheld." State v. De
Blom, 1977 (3) SA 513 (A), at 529 (author's translation).
254 FLETCHER, supra note 251, at 732.
255 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 32(1). Emphasis added.
256 Id. art. 32(2). Emphasis added.
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could be interpreted to mean that a mistake of law which negates
the mental element required by a crime within the jurisdiction of
the ICC could, in the discretion of the Court, be taken to
exculpate the perpetrator. If that is to be what was intended, it
could perhaps be seen as a concession to the common-law
position that ignorance of the law is no excuse. However, that
interpretation would amount to a substantive inconsistency in the
ICC Statute's basic premise of no liability without intent and
knowledge.
A better interpretation would be that a mistake of law is
not an objective ground of justification but may be a ground
excluding liability, and would be such if it negates the mental
element required for a particular crime. If for example the
mental element of a crime is negligence, ignorance of the law (if
it were to exclude liability) must not in itself be negligent. But if
the error does negate whatever mental element is required to
constitute the crime, it stands to reason that the perpetrator
cannot be convicted of that crime.257 The wording of the clause
dealing with mistake of fact was probably intended to address
the perception founded on those legal systems where an error
facti constitutes an objective ground of justification (in
contradistinction to a ground of exculpation). Under the ICC
Statute, a mistake of fact will only serve as an excuse if it
excludes mens rea.
258
Antonio Cassese has criticized the ICC Statute for not
upholding the rule of Anglo-American systems of law that
ignorance of the law is no excuse. 25 9 However, holding someone
accountable for any offence of which intent is an element if that
person genuinely did not know that he or she was acting illegally
would be a contradiction in terms. This is so because absence of
guilty knowledge essentially excludes fault-irrespective of
257 See also Triffterer, supra note 250, at 561 (noting that if the error of
law negates the mental element required, the consequence "is as self-
evident as for an error of fact").
258 See Weigend, supra note 203, at 1390-91.
259 Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 144, at 153-56 (1999).
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whether guilty knowledge is excluded by a mistake regarding the
prevailing facts or regarding the legality of one's conduct.
For that very reason, the Nuremberg tribunals strictly
applied the principle embodied in the maxim ignorantia facti
excusat, but did not find comfort in its counterpart proclaiming
ignoratia iuris non excusat.26 ° In The German High Command
Trial, the Military Tribunal observed:
Many of the defendants were field commanders
and were charged with heavy responsibilities in
active combat. Their legal facilities were
limited. They were soldiers-not lawyers.
Military Commanders in the field with far
reaching military responsibilities cannot be
charged under International Law with criminal
participation in issuing orders which are not
obviously criminal or which they are not shown
to have known to be criminal under International
Law. Such a commander cannot be expected to
draw fine distinctions and conclusions as to the
legality in connection with orders issued by his
superiors. He has the right to presume, in the
absence of specific knowledge to the contrary,
that the legality of such orders has been properly
determined before their issuance. He cannot be
held criminally responsible for a mere error in
judgment as to disputable legal questions.26
There are indeed cases in which the Tribunal proceeded
on the assumption that ignorance of the law is no excuse. For
example, in The Flick Trial, it was decided that in dealing with
property outside the State to which the perpetrator belonged, he
260 See Digest of Laws and Cases Selected and Prepared by the United
Nations War Crimes Commission, 15 L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIMINALS,
182-84 (1949).
261 Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb & Thirteen Others (Case No. 72), in 12
L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIMINALS, 73-74 (1949).
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is expected to ascertain what the national law provides and to
conduct himself within the applicable law: "Ignorance thereof
will not excuse guilt but may mitigate punishment.2 62 In the
Digest of Laws and Cases, the writer observed that "if an order is
not known to an accused to be illegal, and it was not
unreasonable for him to mistake it as legal, he may plead in
mitigation that he acted on that order in carrying out the acts
charged.263 In the Trial of Erhard Milch, the Tribunal referred
to "reluctance of legal authorities to apply to the full the maxim
ignorantia juris non excusat" where the relevant law is
international law.264 This was again explained more fully in The
Trial of Kato:
There are some indications that this principle
[ignoratia iuris non excusat] when applied to the
provisions of international law is not regarded
universally as being in all cases strictly
enforceable ...In the present trial, the Judge
Advocate, in his summing up, said that the Court
must ask itself: "What did each of those accused
know about the rights of a prisoner of war? That
is a matter of fact upon which the Court has to
make up its mind. The Court may well think
that these men are not lawyers: they may not
have heard either of the Hague Convention or
the Geneva Convention; they may not have seen
any book of military law upon the subject; but
the Court has to consider whether men who are
serving either as soldiers or in proximity of
soldiers know as a matter of the general facts of
military life whether a prisoner of war has
262 Trial of Friedrich Flick & Five Others (Case No. 48), in 9 L. REP.
TRIALS WAR CRIMINALS, 23. (1949).
263 Digest of Laws and Cases, supra note 260, at 184.
264 Trial of Erhard Milch (Case No. 39), in 7 L. REP. TRIALS WAR
CRIMINALS, 27, 64 (1948).
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certain rights and whether one of those rights is
not, when captured, to security for his person. It
is a question offact for you.9
265
The rule pertaining to ignorantia iuris must not be
confused with the question of credibility. If ignorance of the law
has not been established, then absence of guilty knowledge will
evidently not arise. In the Trial of Milch, for example, the plea
of ignoratia iuris was rejected "not on the grounds that a mistake
of law, as opposed to a mistake of fact, is never an excuse, but
on the grounds that it was unlikely that Milch could actually
have been so mistaken." 266 In the Trial of Flesch, Judge Soeleth,
in response to the defendant's claim that he could not be held
responsible unless it could be established that he had known that
the superior orders which he executed were illegal, indeed stated
that superior orders could not be pleaded in exculpation. The
Tribunal in the final analysis based a conviction on a finding that
the defendants were in fact aware that they acted in violation of
international law.267
Returning, then, to the ICC Statute: it upholds the
principle of no liability without fault consistently by proclaiming
that ignorance of the law or of the facts excludes liability for the
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Establishing ignorance
of the law will always be difficult, and will become increasingly
so. It is to be hoped that military instructors will provide the
troops under their care with proper instructions as to the
provisions of humanitarian law in general and the provisions of
265 Trial of Captain Eikichi Kato (Case No. 28), in 5 L. REP. TRIALS
WAR CRIMINALS 37, 44. (1948).
266 Trial of Milch, supra note 264, at 64.
267 Trial of Gerhard Friedrich Ernst Flesch (Case No. 36) (Appeal to the
Supreme Court of Norway), in 6 L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIMINALS 111,
120 (1948); see also Trial of KapitAnleutnant Heinz Eck & Others (The
Peleus Trial) (Case No.1), in I L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIMINALS 12, 15
(1947) ( the Tribunal stating that "it must have been obvious to the
rudimentary intelligence that it was not a lawful command" to fire at
helpless survivors of a sea attack struggling in the water).
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the 1CC Statute in particular. 268 The crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC are so clearly wrongful that the defense of
ignorantio iuris will always raise serious questions of credibility.
An error of fact can take on several forms. 269 A
perpetrator might be unaware of certain circumstances that
constitute an element of the crime as such, or the perpetrator
might be well aware that the act falls squarely within the
definition of the crime but believes, erroneously, that grounds
exist which would justify the otherwise illegal conduct.
The notorious judgment of the British House of Lords in
Regina v. Morgan exemplifies the principle that applies when the
act that would constitute a crime is committed under the
mistaken belief that an element of the crime was absent.270 A
majority decision of the Law Lords in that case upheld the
principle that a mistaken belief excludes intent, even if the belief
is unreasonable.
The facts were as follows: The First Defendant invited
three friends to his home and encouraged them to have sexual
intercourse with his wife. He told them that, being "kinky", the
wife might simulate resistance, presumably to add to her sexual
pleasures by being "forced" to submit. The three friends obliged
and were subsequently charged with rape, while the husband was
accused of aiding and abetting in rape. The three raised the
defense that they honestly believed that the victim, in spite of her
struggle and protests, consented. The Court did not believe
them, and they were duly convicted, but not without the above
exposition of the law being confirmed by way of obiter dictum.
Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone stated the position as follows:
"Since honest belief clearly negatives intent, the reasonableness
or otherwise of that belief can only be evidence for or against the
view that the belief and therefore the intent was actually held."27'
268 See Cassese, supra note 259, at 156.
269 See also Triffterer, supra note 250, at 562-63.
270 Reg. v. Morgan, [1975] A.C. 182 (H.L. (E)); see also FLETCHER,
supra note 251, at 699-707.
27 1 Reg. v. Morgan, id at 214, 237 (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton stating:
"If the effect of the evidence as a whole is that the defendant believed,
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If the perpetrator mistakenly believed that any of the
constituent components of the actus reus did not exist, he or she
cannot be said to have acted with intent and knowledge. If, for
example, a commanding officer gives the order that a certain
building be attacked in the bona fide belief that it was an arms
manufacturing plant and it subsequently turns out that the target of
the attack was indeed a pharmaceutical research installation, he or
she cannot be convicted of "[i]ntentionally directing attacks against
buildings dedicated to science, . . . provided they are not military
objectives." '72 Where the perpetrator knows that his or her conduct
is primafacie illegal but believes that the act is rendered lawful by
the one or other ground of justification, the matter is more
complicated. In some legal systems, a mistake of this nature is
regarded as an error iuris, and as such, will not excuse the act (that
is, if ignorance of the law is not accepted as an excuse).
In Erdemovi, the ICTY, following this line of
reasoning, denied "the availability of duress as a complete
defense to combatants who have killed innocent persons."
2 73
The finding has been criticized because it failed to consider
whether a belief that one is acting under duress might exclude
intent on the part of the person under duress.274 The criticism
presupposes that duress is a ground of justification, which the
ICTY was not willing to accept in cases where innocent persons
have been killed.
The judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court of Canada
in the case of Regina v. Finta exemplifies the absence of intent
in cases where the perpetrator's acts would have been unlawful,
but for his or her erroneous belief in the existence of a ground of
justification-in this instance a superior order, which the
or may have believed, that the woman was consenting, then the Crown
has not discharged the onus of proving commission of the offence as
fully defined and ... no question can arise as to whether the belief was
reasonable or not").
272 See ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 8(2)(b)(ix).
273 Prosecutor v Erdemovid, supra note 53, 80.
274 Ambos, supra note 149, at 29-30.
M ENS REA
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
accused erroneously believed was lawful. 27 Imre Finta served as
the senior gendarme officer at a concentration camp in Szeged,
Hungary during World War II. He was charged with being
responsible for the forced confinement of thousands of Jews,
confiscation of their valuables during their internment, their
forced removal form the concentration center to a train station
and, ultimately, their death in German concentration camps. The
removal of Jews occurred pursuant to a Ministry of the Interior
order (the "Baky Order").
Intent to commit a crime against humanity or war crime
presupposes knowledge of the illegality of the act and of the
circumstances that would elevate the criminal conduct to a crime
against humanity or war crime. Provided the accused acted on
reasonable grounds and the orders under which he or she acted
were not manifestly unlawful, an error of fact pertaining to the
legality of the superior order would serve as a justification of the
actus reus. With a bare majority, the Court decided that
prevailing facts afford "an air of reality" to the defense of
absence of intent due to a mistaken belief in the legality of a
superior order. 6 Finta serves as authority for the proposition
275 Regina v. Finta, supra note 41. See Sharon A. Williams, Laudable
Principles Lacking Application: The Prosecution of War Criminals in
Canada, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACHES 151, 164-69 (L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson, eds.)
(1997).
276 Regina v. Finta, supra note 41, at 847-48. The facts that prompted
the outcome of the case included the position of the accused in a
paramilitary organization; the existence of a state of war; the imminent
invasion of Hungary by Soviet forces; the Jewish sentiments in favor of
the Allied forces; publicly stated belief in newspapers in Hungary that
the Jews were subversive and disloyal to the war efforts of Hungary;
the universal expression in newspapers cited by one of the witnesses of
approval of the deportation of Hungarian Jews; the organizational
activity involving the whole Hungarian State together with its ally,
Germany, in the internment and deportation; the open and public
manner of the confiscations under an official, hierarchical sanction; and




that guilty knowledge is an essential component of intent to
commit a crime and that a mistake of fact, even if it related to the
existence of a ground of justification (in contradistinction to the
mistaken belief that an element of the crime is absent), excludes
guilty knowledge. However, applying the (theoretically sound)
principle of guilty knowledge as a prerequisite for intent to the
facts in the case was, to say the least, quite dubious and indeed
provoked severe criticism of the judgment. 7
The ICC Statute excludes liability if a mistake of fact (or
of law) "negates the mental element required by the [or such a]
crime. 278 It could be argued that the perpetrator who knows that
he or she is acting illegally and intentionally executes the act, but
erroneously believes that a ground of justification for the act
exists, cannot claim that the mistake negated the mental element
required for the crime in question. Assume that an Occupying
Power causes the mass transfer of the population of a town in the
occupied territory in the mistaken belief that their evacuation is
necessitated by a pending natural disaster (heavy rains threatened
a dam upstream to break its banks and the commanding officer
thought if that were to happen, the town might be flooded-but
the town was indeed not flooded). The war crime in contention
consists of "[t]he transfer, directly or indirectly, by the
Occupying Power . . . of all or parts of the population of the
occupied territory within or outside this territory., 279 Each one
of the elements to be detected in this definition of the crime was
within the contemplation of the responsible occupying official.
Must he or she for that reason be convicted?
Although the perpetrator in this example intentionally
transferred the population, it cannot, in this writer's respectful
opinion, be said that he knowingly committed the crime. The
perpetrator, in a word, intentionally executed the act but did not
intentionally commit the crime. Absence of guilty knowledge
277 See, e.g., Irwin Cotler, 90 A.J.I.L. 460, 471-74 (case note) (1996);
see generally Josd E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 427-28 (1999).
278 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 32(1).
279 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(viii).
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excludes the mental element required for the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC, irrespective of whether belief in the
legality of one's conduct is founded on an error pertaining to the
elements of the crime per se, or to facts and circumstances that
constitute grounds for legal justification of the act.28 °
If the perpetrator knew that his conduct was unlawful
but did not know that the crime he committed was one within the
jurisdiction of the ICC, that mistaken belief, on the contrary, is
no excuse. 281 Put another way, the perpetrator cannot avoid being
prosecuted in the ICC simply because he or she does not know
that the crime committed falls within the scope of the ICC's
subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Nuremberg Trials have demonstrated that absence
of guilty knowledge was most often raised in the context of
superior orders: allegations of a subordinate that he or she did
not know that the orders executed and which culminated in the
illegal act were unlawful. To plead absence of fault in virtue of a
belief in the legality of superior orders, the accused must show
"an inexcusable ignorance of their illegality." 28 2 In the Trial of
Otto Ohlendorf it was further held that "one who embarks on a
criminal enterprise of obvious magnitude is expected to
anticipate what the enterprise will logically lead to." 283  The
same judgment is authority for the proposition that a perpetrator
cannot claim absence of guilty knowledge based on his or her
ignorance of the illegality of the superior orders upon which he
or she executed the act, if he or she in any event approved what
had to be done:
280 See also Eser, supra note 237, at 549 (observing, with reference to
self-defense, that a perpetrator who reasonably believes that he or she
was under attack while that was, objectively, not the case, cannot rely
on this ground of justification to escape liability but "may resort to
mistake of fact ... for excluding criminal responsibility.").
281 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 32(2).
282 Trial of Otto Ohlendorf & Others, cited in the Notes on Trial of




The doer may not plead innocence to a criminal
act ordered by his superior if he is in accord with
the principle and intent of the superior . . . In
order successfully to plead the defence of
Superior Orders the opposition of the doer must
be constant ... If at any time after receiving the
order he acquiesces in its illegal character, the
defence of Superior Orders is closed to him.
284
The ICC Statute also deals separately with the special
instance of ignorance of the law/facts deriving form superior
285orders. As a general rule, acting upon superior orders to
commit a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC is no excuse,
because the order to commit any of those crimes is in itself
unlawful and must be disobeyed by the subordinate. But there is
this exception to the rule: if the perpetrator of the crime acted
upon the orders of his or her government, or of a military or
civilian superior, while being unaware that the order was
unlawful, the subordinate will not be responsible for the offence,
284 id.
285 Certain critique of the provisions regarding mistake advanced by
Kai Ambos is based on the erroneous assumption that the ICC Statute
only (explicitly) recognizes mistake of law as a ground of exculpation
in the case of superior orders. Ambos, supra note 149, at 29. The ICC
Statute in fact recognizes mistake of law as a ground of exculpation in
all cases where the perpetrator, because of the mistake, lacks mens rea.
It deals separately with command responsibility because that is the
instance where a mistake of law would most likely occur. It is also
wrong to assume, as does Kai Ambos, that a mistaken belief that a
ground of justification (for example duress) exists does not exclude
mens rea. Ambos, supra note 149, at 30. If the perpetrator honestly
believes that his act would fall within the confines of circumstances
that would legally deprive the act of criminality, then it cannot be said
that he intentionally committed the crime. Guilty knowledge is an
essential component of intent, and the ICC Statute deliberately
excluded all doubts that might be entertained in this regard by basing
accountability (as a general rule) on intent and knowledge.
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provided he or she was under a legal obligation to obey orders
286
of the government or of the concerned military or civilian
superior, and the order was not manifestly unlawful. 28 7 The ICC
Statute goes on to proclaim that orders to commit genocide or
crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful, 288 which
means that under the ICC Statute as it stands only war crimes
can be excused under this provision. That, again, stands to
reason. No one claiming ignorantia iuris in respect of genocide
or crimes against humanity can be taken seriously.
Cassese pointed out that international humanitarian law
does not make a similar exception in cases of war crimes. Under
international law, superior order is never an excuse. 2 9 However,
in providing that a war crime committed on the authority of a
superior order will only come within the jurisdiction of the ICC
if the order was manifestly unlawful, the ICC Statute actually
took its lead from the Nuremberg Trials: the presumption that a
soldier has the right to presume that the orders were lawful.290
Superior orders could be unlawful on two possible grounds:
because the officer giving the order had no authority to do so, or
because the act which the subordinate was ordered to execute per
se constituted a crime under international humanitarian law.
Perhaps drafters of the ICC Statute were not sufficiently
286 The formulation here was carefully drafted. The ICC Statute does
not refer to a legal obligation to obey the specific order to commit the
crime being investigated, because the order to commit a crime within
the jurisdiction of the ICC would never incur a legal obligation to obey.
The appropriate requirement is an obligation in general to obey orders
from the governmental, military or civilian source of those orders.
287 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 32(2), read with art. 33(1).
288 Id art. 33(2).
289 Cassese, supra note 259, at 156-57. Ruth Wedgwood has proposed
that all policy decisions on employment of force ought only to be
actionable in the ICC if they are manifestly unlawful and that the ICC
should make allowance for "a margin of appreciation" in the detailed
application of war crimes. Ruth Wedgwood, The International
Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 93, 103 (1999).
290 See supra, the text accompanying note 261.
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sensitive to this distinction. The requirement of the order having
to be manifestly unlawful ought only to apply to the first of these
two possibilities because an order to commit a war crime would
most likely always be manifestly unlawful. This applies to
almost all war crimes. As time goes on, the war crimes that
might still not be matters of general knowledge will soon
become so. Persons claiming that they did not know that the
conduct in question constituted a war crime will increasingly
find their credibility being challenged. According to Cassese,
"[gi]ven the specificity of article 8 [defining war crimes], one
fails to see under what circumstances the order to commit one of
the crimes listed therein may be regarded as being not manifestly
unlawful." 29'
A German analyst described the treatment of mistake in
the ICC Statute, from a German perspective,292 as "rather
archaic."293 Whereas the ICC Statute based its defenses theory
on the common-law (and French) distinction between an error of
fact and an error of law, and furthermore confines mistake of fact
as a defense to instances where the error excludes fault (instead,
as in some jurisdictions, as a ground of justification), there might
be instances of a bonafide and inescapable error that would not
exonerate the perpetrator from punishment.294 Here, again, the
critique is a matter of dogmatic classification rather than
practical significance. The jurisdiction of the ICC is confined to
a limited number of serious international crimes and not the kind
of trivialities or technicalities that might benefit from a different
focus. Furthermore, rendering the principle of no liability
291 Cassese, supra note 159, at 157.
292 German jurisprudence relating to mistake is based on the distinction
between mistake in regard to the definitional element of a crime
(Tatbetsandsmaifigkeit) and a mistake in regard to the unlawfulness of
the act (Rechtswidrichkeit); and as to the former, a further distinction is
made between a normative mistake (an error as to the objective
requirements for the crime) and a factual mistake (and error as to a fact
that constitutes an element of the crime).
293 Weigend, supra note 203, at 1392.
94Id at 1390-93.
MENS REA
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
without fault the primary concern of its accountability regime,
the ICC Statute is well on top of all ethical demands of the legal
idea.
German jurisprudence pertaining to defenses in criminal
law also accommodates the premise of situation ethics-an
insight of existential philosophy which recognizes the salience of
a moral demand that does not derive from a general norm of
proper conduct (e.g., love thy neighbor, do onto others, etc.), but
applies only to a particular person, at a particular moment, and in
a particular situation. German jurisprudence accordingly
distinguishes between justification, which applies generally, and
excuse, which would warrant a finding of not guilty based on the
individual situation or very special circumstances in which the
perpetrator hound him- or herself. An excuse may thus be based
on "honest error," that is, a genuine moral conflict, or an
apparently unavoidable order that would make it reasonable to
exclude punishability. 29' Examples may include a public official
who has been given an ultimatum: rape a woman as an act in
furtherance of genocide or face some personal hardship as a
consequence of insubordination, or a soldier with orders to kill a
prisoner of war or pay with his own life.
The ICC Statute adequately takes care of such
contingencies within the reach of situation ethics. The person
who commits a wrongful act in unavoidable circumstances that
left him with little choice can be accommodated by either not
being indicted,296 or being exonerated under the rules of duress
or necessity, or eventually receiving a lenient sentence.
295 See Albin Eser, "Defences" in War Crime Trials, 24 ISRAELI Y.B.
HUM. RTs. 203 (1994).
296 See ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 53(1)(c) (affording the
Prosecutor a discretion not to proceed with an investigation if,
considering the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, the
investigation would not be in the interest of justice).
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5. Other Grounds for Exculpation
The ICC Statute left the door open for the Court to
consider other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
derived from applicable law, including general principles of law
sanctioned by national legal systems of the world. 297
Provocation, for example, does not in general serve as a ground
of justification of criminal conduct. However, should the cause
of anger provoke the perpetrator to lose all control over his or
her conduct, the provocation might well be taken to have
excluded intent to commit a particular retaliatory act.
II. Concluding Remarks
The power of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction in any
particular case has deliberately been subjected to severe
limitations. This is evidenced:
by the principle of complementarity, which affords
the first right and duty to prosecute perpetrators of
the crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the ICC to national states with a special interest in
the matter and limits admissibility of a case in the
ICC to instances where the national state is either
unwilling or unable to bring the perpetrator to
justice;
* by restricting "unwillingness" to instances where an
investigation or prosecution in the national court was
prompted by the special intent of shielding the
perpetrator from prosecution in the ICC, and being
"unable" to instances where the national state suffers
from a total or substantial collapse of its criminal
justice system;
* by confining the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC
297 ICC Statute, supra note 10, art. 31(3), read with art. 21(1)(c); see
also Eser, supra note 237, at 543-44.
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to only the most serious manifestations of the crimes
over which it has jurisdiction and incorporating in
the definitions of crimes against humanity and war
crimes a restrictive threshold to be met before the
ICC can exercise jurisdiction;
by affording to all states (not only States Parties)
standing to contest the exercise of jurisdiction by the
ICC on so-called admissibility grounds, which
include the fact that the protesting state is
conducting, or has conducted, a bona fide
investigation or prosecution in the matter (no matter
what the outcome of that investigation or
prosecution might have been, provided only it was
not a sham within the meaning of "unwillingness"),
or that the crime to be prosecuted is not of a
sufficiently serious nature to merit prosecution in the
ICC;
* by insisting that the definitions of crimes shall be
subject to restrictive interpretation, may not be
extended by analogy, and in the case of ambiguities
must be interpreted to the advantage of an accused,
and thereby altogether precluding the advent of
judicial activism;
* by making the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC in
cases other than those emanating from a Security
Council referral subject to a decree requiring that
either the state of which the accused is a national or
the state on the territory of which the alleged crime
was committed must either have ratified the ICC
Statute or agreed on an ad hoc basis to the exercise
ofjurisdiction by the ICC in a particular case;
* by subjecting the power of the Prosecutor to conduct
an investigation proprio motu to judicial control.
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Drafters of the ICC Statute has also set a high threshold
for convictions in the ICC by upholding the salient principle of
no liability without fault and by confining the mens rea element
of the crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC, as
a general rule, to the most stringent standards of intent, including
the principle that guilty knowledge is an essential ingredient of
willful criminal conduct.
The ICC regime has been criticized because it sets its
jurisdictional aim, the conditions of admissibility, and the
substantive elements of the crimes extremely high.2 98 However,
doing just that has been informed, on the one hand, by the
express design to confine the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC
to the most serious violations of the concerned criminal
proscriptions only, and on the other, by the resolve to uphold a
certain perception of mens rea based on the highest ethical
standards of the legal idea.
298 See, e.g., Pellet, Applicable Law, in COMMENTARY ON THE ICC,
supra note 8, 1051, at 1056, 1058-59, 1083-84.
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